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1. INTRODUCTION 
The international monetary system is not a traditional area 
of study in international relations and is often discussed using 
a 'scientific-economic' approach, which assumes that the system 
is politically neutral. Instead this paper takes a 'pol' tical 
economic' approach (Johnson, 1971) and argues that the acceptance 
of a national currency as the dominant medium of exchange for 
international trade and finance creates a web of economic and 
political interdependence between the state which issues the 
'key' currency and the rest of the world. Moreover the key 
currency state achieves a measure of monetary hegemony which can 
have significant costs and benefits both for itself and for other 
states which accept its currency in international transactions. 
In a national economy distinct economic benefits ar1se Ero}n 
the 1ssue of a single currency by a central bank and similarly: 
in the international economy, lower transactions costs and 
increased certainty, (or reduced exchange risk) arise from the 
widespread acceptance of a key currency such as British sterling 
in the nineteenth century or the American dollar in the postwar 
period. The absence of a world central bank in the international 
economy however vitiates the possibility of an apolitical 
international currency. Consequently a considerable degree of 
international consensus is required for a particular currency to 
be widely accepted as the medium of exchange, unit of ac Ollot and 
store of value for world trade and finance. 
For the purpose of this paper a key currency is defined as a 
national currency which has been accepted as the predominant form 
of international money in the world economy. It is the dominance 
of the key currency in international trade and finance that 
distinguished it from 'vehicle' currencies, which are merely used 
widely in private or government international transactions 
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(Block, 1977) or the older definition of key currenCles (Williams 
1947) as major currencies which are convertible to gold. 
There appears to be a marked advantage for large compared to 
small economies in issuing the key currency since the central 
economy is more vulnerable to fluc t u a tions within the world 
economy and must maintain open trade and financial markets. The 
relatively large size of the nineteenth century British economy 
and twentieth century postwar American economy assured the value 
and stability of the pound and the dollar and both of these 
economies were also politically stable and free from excessive 
regulations which could hamper the flexibility and liquidity 
of the key currency. As Krause observes: 
"The (key currency) country must be relatively rich so 
as to enable it to lend abroad. It must be important 
ln international trade so as to have international 
linkages. It must have sophisticated financial 
institutions to p er E rm the functions required by 
business. Furthermore it must have deep and 
unregulated markets. Foreigners must be able to buy 
and sell its currency without destabilizing the 
exchange rate, and to lend to and borrow from it 
without government interference. Clearly there are 
very few currencies that come close to fulfilling all 
of these criteria"(Krause, 1988 p7) 
In fact only the British Pound and the American dollar have 
so far been accepted as the key currency and only for proscribed 
periods. Over most of the nineteenth century 'the identity of 
gold and sterling seemed almost a law of nature, and even more 
than the link with gold sterling's g en ral acceptability promoted 
confidence' (Yeager, 1966) but this confidence began to wane 
after the first world war due to Britain's worsened economic 
performance and the gradual dimunition of its relative weight ln 
the world economy. In the 1980s a similar decline seems to have 
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occurred for the united States and could undermine the dollar's 
key position in world trade and finance. 
Although the us economy is still large In world terms, the 
European Community and Japan are of similar economlC importance 
and Japan's share of world trade and investment is continuing to 
grow rapidly. The question has therefore arisen as to whether 
the ECU or the yen will complement or rep l ace the dollar as the 
key currency in the future, or whether a multipolar currency 
system is likely to emerge. The probability of such a transition 
hinges partly on whether either currency can perform better than 
the dollar in terms of maintaining confidence in its stability 
and value in international trade and finance. As Floyd notes 
'Poor policy performance on the part of a key currency country 
will cause it to lose that status to other countries with better 
international monetary control' (Floyd, 1985) but the emergence 
of a new key currency system is also constrained by political 
factors , as will be discussed below. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role and impact 
of a key currency in the international man tary s y s tem and In 
international relations. A central tenet of the following 
discussion is that the country responsible for issuing the key 
currency can have a significant influence on the stability of 
international money and the distribution of wealth and power 
among the nominally sovereign and independent states in the world 
economy. The paper is divided into four principal sections which 
provide perspectives on monetary order, the operation of the 
sterling and dollar key currency reglmes, a review of the 
relationship between the dollar and the yen and a discussion of 
the apparent political and economic costs and benefi ts of a key 
currency regime for the dominant economic state and the rest o f 
the world. In particular the paper seeks to examine the 
prospects for a yen key currency regime and the costs and 
benefits of a diminution of the dollar's role in the 
international political economy. 
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2. PERSPECTIVES ON MONETARY ORDER 
The international monetary system is the mechanism which 
connects national currency areas and allows the creation of 
monetary order through a framework of rules, norms and 
conventions which guide the operation of the monetary system 
(Mundell, 1973). This system is characterised by a hierarchy of 
national currencies, ranked according to the strength of their 
economies of origin. Only a few major currenc1es are used to 
denominate world trade and finance and the framework of monetary 
order is similarly shaped by a small number of major econom1es. 
When one economic power becomes dominant its currency can 
assume a key role in the world economy. Developments in the 
central economy can then have a significant effect in influencing 
the level of world interest rates, the global money supply and 
confidence in the monetary order, particularly since its currency 
is generally accepted as international money. The rest of the 
world thereby enters into an asymmetrical relationship of 
interdependence with the central economy since the stability of 
the monetary order is linked to the conduct of fiscal and 
monetary policy 1n that economy_ A stable key currency can 
contribute to a sustainable growth in world trade and finance 
but if confidence in the key currency falters a multipolar 
currency system is likely to emerge, reflecting either 
fundamental changes in the world economy or poor policy 
co-ordination in the central economy. 
Monetary Hegemony 
Hegemony is a term used to denote political leadership or 
the influence of one state over others and can be appl i ed to t he 
international monetary system in the sense that the predomi n a nt 
economy supplies the key international currency, is a major 
source of credit or liquidity and maintains a large open ma r ket 
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for trade and finance. In the first stages of their key currency 
regimes Britain, in the nineteenth century and the United States 
in the postwar period, satisfied all of these requirements and 
consequently had a hegemonic influence on the international trade 
and monetary system. 
In a key currency regime the central economy is a natural 
source of international liquidity thr ugh either trade, 
investment or credit creation. Its financial system has a 
similar role to that of a central bank which must be able to lend 
to other banks at all times, although usually on its own terms. 
The 'lender of last resort' eases international adjustment crises 
and allows the central economy to influence the level of interest 
rates, global money supply and maintain confidence in the 
stability of the international monetary system. It is arguable 
that the economic leader or hegemon 'must also manage in some 
degree, the structure of foreign exchange rates and provide a 
degree of co-ordination of domestic monetary policies' 
(Kindleberger, 1981). 
Similarly Gilpin considers that a hegemonic power is needed 
to reconcile the national policies of individual states and to 
'establish the prerequisites of a stable international monetary 
order' (Gilpin, 1981) while, to Kindleberger the hegemon 
provides a market for distress goods, a counter-cyclical source 
of capital and a rediscount mechanism to provide liquidity 'when 
the monetary system is frozen 1n panic' which are all essential 
for a stable monetary order. An extension of this argument is 
that the dominant economy provides the preconditions for an o~ e . l 
liberal system by creating the framework of rules which 
constitutes international monetary order since "hegemonic 
structures of power, dominated by a single country, are most 
conducive to the development of strong international regimes 
whose r ul es are relatively precise and well obeyed" (Keohane, 
1980). 
The extent of monetary hegemony apparent in each regime 
appears to differ according the dominance of the central economy 
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and the need for stability in the key currency to underwrite 
international confidence in the system. Britain achieved only a 
limited form of currency hegemony since international liquidity 
was a function of the rate of gold discovery rather than an 
expansion of the monetary base in the central economy, and since 
the Bank Charter Act of 1844 imposed statutory restrictions up to 
1914 on the payment of debt by money creation (Strange, 1981). 
Britain's ga1ns from currency hegemony were also limited by 
the occasional need to force a contraction of domestic activity 
to avoid an outflow of gold or capital, which would destabilise 
the key currency. Nevertheless the importance of its currency, 
as well as its economy allowed Britain to benefit from its 
central position in international trade and finance. 
The capability of a monetary regime to provide international 
liquidity, ease of exchange rate adjustments and confidence 1n 
the key currency appears to contribute to its stability and this 
capability is affected by both the size of the key currency 
economy and by its political influence on other members of the 
international monetary system. As the dominance of the leading 
economy is challenged and becomes less absolute, the strength of 
the rules of the game seem to weaken, unless political 
consensusor policy co-ordination maintains the system. 
Britain was able to establish th ~terling-gold standard 
because of its industrial and financial predominance, but the 
system eventually became unstable as confidence fell in Britain's 
capacity to continue the functions of providing liquidity and 
supporting sterling's value. One reason for this instability was 
the declining international competitiveness of British industry, 
. b due partly to the strength of sterl1ng and partlyAthe openness of 
the British economy to trade competition. Another was the cost 
of the first world war which damaged Britain's capacity to 
provide liquidity and maintain confid~ ce in the system. As New 
York increasingly became the dominant international lender and 
creditor, sterling's position became dependent on US support and 
Britain's attempt to restore sterling as a key currency in the 
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1920s failed when the US stockmarket crash of 1929 caused a 
contraction of international liquidity. 
The collapse of the world monetary system in 1929 has been 
attributed to the failure of the US monetary authority, the 
Federal Reserve, to take counter-cyclical action after the Wall 
Street stockmarket crash by expanding international liquidity 
( Ki n leberger 1981). Instead the Federal Reserve followed a 
pro-cyclical policy and caused a fall in the US money supply of 
one third, which contributed to the following world recession. 
In the 1940s the united States began to accept the need for 
a more positive approach to the management of international 
monetary order and the 1944 Bretton Woods agreement, together 
with us economic predominance, established the dollar as the key 
currency over the 1950s and early 1960s when the US essentially 
followed a policy of 'benign neglect' of the dollar (McKinnon, 
1974) by pursuing stable fiscal and monetary policies. 
Continual deficits by the key currency country i n the 1960s 
and 1970s led to a marked lncrease in the volume of international 
reserves as ~ ntral banks purchased dollar securities to fund the 
US deficit. Private international liquidity was also boosted by 
the outflow of dollars, firstly by borrowing dollars in New York, 
up to the imposition of the Interest Equalisation Tax and 
thereafter through the Eurodollar market (Triffin, 1977). 
The level of dollar deficits in the 1950s and 1960s of 
around $2-4 billion per annum rose markedly in the 1970s to 
average levels of $20-30 billion each year. This increase in 
international liquidity occurred because of fiscal expansion in 
the United States to pay for both the Vietnam War and Presiden t 
Johnson's 'Great Societ~! w ~ t ' o ut an lncrease in tax revenue. A 
~ 
further fiscal and monetary expansion occurred in the 1970s und e r 
Presidents Nixon and Carter as an indirect policy solution to t he 
oil crisis and as a means to US economic recovery. Domestic 
policies were therefore judged more important than a stable 
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dollar and succeSSlve US administration continued to follow a 
policy of benign neglect of the dollar. 
The suspenslon of the dollar's official convertibility to 
gold by President Nixon in 1971 has been interpreted as an 
exercise of monetary hegemony for national interest (Strange, 
1976) and a renunciation of its international responsibilities so 
as to free national policy making from international constraints 
(Gowa, 1983). 
This unilateral display of power over the monetary system 
(Odell, 1982) was, perhaps, only possible because of the 
political dominance of the US over Japan and West Germany, the 
next largest western economies. The reluctance of these 
countries to challenge the dollar's hegemony allowed certain 
excesses in us economic policy. Such a challenge would have 
required these powers to ' .•. unite for an economic confrontation 
with the united States •.. a course not easily compatible with 
their posture as American protectorates' (Calleo, 1982). 
Continual budget and trade deficits by the US in the 1970s 
and 1980s have arguably transferred part of the cost of US 
foreign policy to its political allies who have helped fund these 
deficits. Hence Gilpin has claimed that the US 'ran its foreign 
policy largely on credit by taking advantage of its role as world 
banker' (Gilpin, 1987). This approach equates defence 
expenditure with the budget deficit and was given support in 1971 
when Treasury Secretary Connally explicitly linked the cost of US 
troops in Western Europe with the US defence deficit. 
In the 1980s the Reagan Administration's strategy of deficit 
financed economic expansion continued to strain the stability of 
the international monetary system and the value of the key 
currency. The trade and budget deficits of the Dr i ted States 
were principally funded by West Germany and Japan, the world's 
major creditors, but this stream of deficits turned the US into 
the world's largest debtor by 1987. With an economy constrained 
by this debt, it is no longer clear that the US can act alone as 
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the monetary hegemon or unilaterally change the rules of the 
international monetary system. 
Power and Interdependence 
The three key currency regimes considered in this paper all 
involved differ en t conventions, norms and 'rules of the game' 
between member economies and have been shaped by the distribution 
of geopolitical power among states and partly by market forces 
(Keohane and Nye, 1977). In their formation and evolution these 
regimes have involved varying degrees of monetary hegemony but 
the responsibility of the central economy for the stability of 
international money implicitly created a web of interdependence 
between the key currency state and other states. The extent to 
which regime norms and rules have constrained major states 1n 
these regimes is a measure of both monetary hege 1uony and 
interdependence, particularly if compliance to established rules 
compromises the national interests of these states. 
In a key currency regime interdependence between states 
appears asymmetrical since peripheral states peg their currencies 
to the numeraire and are vulnerable to the conduct of monetary 
and fiscal policy in the central economy. On the other hand the 
key currency state enjoys a degree of insulation from normal 
balance of payments constraints and the associated need for 
economic adjustment. A low vulnerability to adjustment implies 
a degree of political power (Cohen, 1977) but if the key currency 
is stable and monetary hegemony is not abused, then the reg1me 
benefits all states through lower transaction costs and risk. In 
the terminology of interdependence the key currency state is 
therefore less 'vulnerable' and 'sensitive' (Keohane, Nye, 1977) 
than other states but its lower sensitivity can reduce both the 
rate of adjustment and competitiveness of its trade and financial 
sectors. 
The level of interdependence appears to have been higher in 
a floating exchange rate regime (the dollar after 1971) than in 
the fixed regimes of the Gold Standard (1874- 191 3) or Bretton 
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Woods up to 1971 because of increased financial integration 
between states. Since the goods and assets of each state are 
becoming more substitutable and there are only a small number of 
influential states (Hamada, 1985) it is possible that the level 
of international monetary interdependence is increasing. The 
vast increase in the size of international capital markets since 
the 1960s, from $60 billion in 1970 to over $2.5 trillion in 1988 
(BIS, 1987) is one manifestation of increased financial 
integration, which has reduced national economic sovereignty. 
Increas access to international capital markets by 
numerous sovereign debtors in the 1970s and 1980s reduced their 
immediate need for adjustment and allowed a secular rise in the 
size of current account imbalances. The resulting higher level 
of debt also made many countries more sensitive to changes 1n 
monetary policy within the key currency power, since these were 
rapidly transmitted through movements in exchange rates, interest 
rates and capital flows. The increasing importance of external 
capital to fund fiscal and trade deficits has also increased the 
system's vulnerability to external shock, as is d eea nstrated by 
the increased indebtedness of the Third World states. 
The build-up of Third World debt in the 1970s in a climate 
of loose US monetary policy and often negative real interest 
rates led to a crisis when the US switched to a policy of 
monetary contraction in 1979 and interest rates rose sharply. 
Indebted Third World states, particularly in Latin America, were 
forced to rollover loans and rely on further capital inflows to 
cover interest payments,so that overall debt increased 
drar a tically without any further capital being directed into 
productive sectors in these economies. 
The exper1ence of Latin America illustrates the severe 
costs of interdependence on economic sovereignty (Crierco, 1988) 
in an asymmetrical monetary order and can be contrasted with the 
much looser adjustment pressure on the key currency state since 
it became the world's largest debtor. However the monetary 
hegemony of the key currency state 1S being increasingly 
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challenged because of this indebtedness and its consequent 
inability to adequately fulfill the function of world banker and 
lender of last resort to the international monetary system. 
The Extent of Power 
International monetary power can be defined as the 'ability 
to utilise the existing adjustment mechanism or the liquidity 
creation to advantage ..• or to modify either mechanism to 
advantage ' (Cohen, 1977). Such power resides primarily with the 
key currency state which can directly affect the level of 
international liquidity and credit creation. As the creation of 
money or credit 'confers power as well as wealth on the creator' 
(Strange, 1987) it can be a major source of power in the world 
economy. 
Such wealth creation, though fiat o r ~e ig~iorage, can be 
converted into other forms of influence (Knorr, 1977) but can 
destabilize the value of the key currency. Moreover the 
increased purchasing power of the central economy gives it access 
to a greater share of global resources than it would otherwise 
enJoy. It is therefore arguable that both Britain and the United 
States achieved a fillip to economic power during their key 
currency regimes, but this eroded as the international value of 
their currencies declined. 
Power is a central concept in international relations a n 
has military, political, technological and economic compon n t s , 
and the natural sources of national power are territory, 
population , natural resources, geography and national unity. 
However these measures usually ignore the ability to project 
economic power via exchange rates or through monetary policy. 
Further, the power to run domestic economic policy independently 
in a multipower interdependent world, is virtually restricted to 
the key currency country. 
The key or 'master' currency (Strange, 1976) has both 
economic and political importance for the power which issues it 
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since' ... a country's exchange rat e . ~ lRore than a number ... It is 
an emblem of its importance in the world, a sort of international 
status symbol" (Kindleberger, 1971). Thus the depreciation of 
the British pound in the 1920s was considered a blow to national 
pride and in 1985 President Reagan said that 'a strong dollar 
means a strong America', although this perception was to change 
after the 1985 Plaza Accord. The relative value of a currency is 
also of political importance because it affects the flow and 
distribution of resources between states involved in the 
) 
international economy, through changes in a states purchasing 
power ln interl tional trade and the international value of its 
stock of financial assets. 
Seigniorage 
The key currency state is able to reap a seigniorage gain 
from issuing international money, which equals the increase ln 
its purchasing power minus the cost of producing the money 
(Kindleberger, 1981) and the degree of seigniorage seems to vary 
in each regime (Hamada, 1985). 
In a gold standard seigniorage represents the difference 
between the cost of production and the value of gold as money. 
In -the sterling-gold and dollar-gold c on v e rtible regimes the Slze 
of seigniorage depended on the cost of maintaining a store of 
monetary gold by the key currency power and the interest payable 
on 'exported money' which was then reinvested in the key currency 
reglmes. This cost arose because a sterling or dollar overhang 
could threaten the continuance of convertibility once 
international confidence in the key currency waned, as occurred 
with sterling by 1931 and the dollar in 1971. In the 
sterling-gold standard reglme seigniorage was const rain d by 
Britain's low reserves and the need for confidence in the 
international currency (McCloskey, 1985). Hence the supply of 
convertible fiduciary money was closely related to the physical 
gold stock and the rate of economic growth in the world economy 
(Triffin, 1978). 
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Similarly under Bretton Woods the dollar's convertibility to 
gold obliged the US to hold a large stock of gold and initially 
discouraged abuse of seigniorage. However persistent trade 
deficits in late 1960s and a monetary expansion to finance 
Vietnam and the Great Society created a dollar overhang which 
undermined convertibility. Under the pure inconvertible dollar 
standard which followed Bretton Woods seigniorage can be defined 
as the increase in purchasing power from printing money to 
finance the key currency power's deficits, minus the cost of an 
accumulating store of dollars outside the monetary system of the 
US. This cost is more indirect than the obligation of 
convertibility and in the short term the US has been able to 
create international purchasing power by fiat, but has also been 
subject to an increasing wave of portfolio and direct foreign 
investment as some of the dollar overhang is recyc led back to the 
key currency country. 
Credit and Power 
The key currency country has traditionally been the world's 
major creditor economy, at least in the initial phase of its 
monetary regIme. International acceptance of sterling as the key 
currency in the second half of the nineteenth century and until 
1914, was based not only on its industrial size but also on its 
financial predominance and role as international creditor. 
Britain ran a surplus on its current account for more than a 
century up to 1914 and over the whole period these surpluses were 
nearly fully recycled as overseas investment (Imlah, 1958). 
After 1914 however Britain's trade balance steadily worsened and 
its surplus on capital account was eroded by the cost of the 
first world war. 
The United States became a surplus economy after 1918 but 
the dollar did not become the key currency until the 1940s, 
partly because of political turmoil In the rest of the world and 
the de facto role of the US economy as world banker. From the 
1940s the US provided both credit and liquidity for the world 
economy through an outflow of aid, dir_c l invest ent and ilitary 
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expenditure, both to aid Western recovery and reinforce its 
strategy of containment. However by the 1970s the US balance of 
trade had moved into deficit and by the 1980s its capital account 
has also become negative. The increased indebtedness of the US 
raises the question of whether the key currency state needs to be 
a net creditor (Arase, 1988) and whether the new creditor states 
of Japan and West Germany will inevitably share monetary 
hegemony. 
The transformation of the US from a creditor to a debtor 
economy in the 1980s has eroded the capacity of the key currency 
power to act as world banker or lender of last resort. Triffin 
observes that the US is using its position' ••. to finance most of 
its own large and mounting deficits, rather that those of the 
rest of the world, generally poorer and less endowed with 
capital' (Triffin, 1987). As the major creditor of the 1980s 
Japan seems to have inherited the responsibility to recycle 
surpluses on current account to maintain world growth and the 
Economic Planning Agency has stated that the: 
"Smooth operation of the World economy requires that 
current account surpluses be recycled as capital 
throughout the wor ld. ~s the country with the world's 
biggest surpluses, Japan must recycle its earnings 
effectively. It must serve as a supplier of capital 
to the world" (EPA 1986 White Paper) 
A major problem in achieving this goal is the Yen's poor 
international exposure as an international currency and to more 
effectively recycle Japan's surplus the yen must become more 
important in the international monetary system (Shimano, 1987). 
The slowness of the Japanese Government to internationalise the 
Yen and its traditional reluctance to take a major role in policy 
co-ordination has however restricted the impact of Japan's 
creditor status and the efficiency of its finan e ' al markets in 
recycling capital. Nevertheless continual Japanese financial 
deregulation in the 1980s supports the contention that Japan will 
more effectively fulfill the key currency power's usual functions 
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of lender of last resort and world creditor. It is not yet clear 
how such a transition will affect Japan's power over the 
international monetary system. 
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3. KEY CURRENCY REGIMES 
The British Sterling Regime 
During the nineteenth century the British pound sterling was 
internationally accepted as the principal medium of world trade 
and finance because of Britain's economic importance and the 
stability of its currency_ The decision of the British 
Government in 1819 to link sterling to gold also reinforced 
international confidence in the currency, particularly as rival 
currencies were more vulnerable to disruption from political 
crlses. 
In the gold standard of 1876-1913 the leading economies also 
fixed the value of their currencies to gold but Britain retained 
its position as the key currency power and Lo n n ~as the 
financial centre of the reglme. As the world's largest creditor 
and main source of international capital Britain acted as the 
world banker and lender of last resort to the international 
monetary system. Sterling remained the major vehicle currency 
and means of international payment and a significant share of 
non-British world trade was invoiced in this currency, as well as 
Britain's international trade and financial transactions. The 
London Commodity exchange, Gold market, money market and stock 
rket, all of world importance, were all denominated in 
Britain's domestic currency and central banks of other countries 
held sterling as a reserve asset (Edelstein, 1982). Over the 
period 1870 to 1913 Britain's outflow of overseas lending and 
investment exceeded 5 per cent of GNP and net property income 
from its stock of investment abroad rose from 5 to 8 per cent of 
GNP (see table 1), allowing Britain to more easily run a trade 
deficit, which also provided other countries with a large open 
market and a means of earning sterling (Imlah, 1968). 
The dominant role of the British currency gave that country 
a certain degree of influe l~ 1 _c onomic affairs, with the Bank 
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TABLE 1: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN 1871-1915 
(MILLION POUNDS STERLING) 
1871-75 
1876-80 
1881-85 
1886-90 
1891-95 
1886-1900 
1901-05 
1906-10 
1911-15 
Balance 
of 
Trade 
-19.3 
-78.9 
-56.4 
-44.3 
-84.4 
-118.4 
-115.0 
-79.1 
-61.3 
(% 
GNP) 
1.7 
6.2 
4.2 
3.3 
5.6 
7.2 
6.4 
3.8 
na 
SOURCE: Edelstein (1982) p. 233 
Invest-
ment (% 
Income GNP) 
50.0 4.5 
56.3 4.4 
64.8 4.9 
84.2 6.2 
94.0 6.3 
100.2 6.1 
113.0 6.3 
151.4 7.2 
=188.0 na 
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Current 
Account (% 
Balance GNP) 
75.6 6.9 
23.7 1.9 
56.5 4.3 
85.4 6.3 
55.5 3.7 
28.6 1.8 
41.2 2.3 
147.5 7.1 
-211.8 na 
of England acting as 'conductor of the international orchestra', 
(Keynes, 1971 p272) particularly through its use of official 
discount rates to affect monetary flows and maintain the value of 
sterling. As the key currency country Britain had to expand or 
contract its money supply to preserve external stability. If a 
sterling crisis developed, capital flowed out of Britain thereby 
increasing domestic interest rates, leading to a monetary 
contraction and a balance of payments adjustment to support the 
pound. Yeager notes tha·t "c h Ba nk of England: " •••. raised and 
lowered the Bank rate almost solely out of concern for its own 
reserves ... (but) ... the Bank did manage the nineteenth century 
gold standard in the sense of dominating it."(Yeager, 1966). 
In its role as the world financial centre, London acted as 
the world's banker in absorbing capital inflows and co-ordinating 
long term foreign investment outflows to the rest of the world, 
hut. principally to North America, Australasia and Latin America. 
rr~is investment outflow allowed a major expansion of trade 
between industrial and primary producing countries. Notably 
speculative capital flows had a minor role in the gold standard 
since national money supplies tended to adjust to support the 
existing regime without overt government intervention. (Edelstein, 
1982) 
Britain's dominant position in the international monetary 
system for these decades was based on the acceptance of sterling 
as the key currency for both capital and current account 
transactions (Cohen, 1971) and confidence in the soundness of the 
British economy. For much of the nineteenth century Britain was 
the largest exporter of manufactures and the world's largest 
overseas investor. Britain's acceptance of free trade provided a 
large open market for deficit countries and encouraged growth In 
world trade. Its counter-cyclical long term lending helped 
stabilise the world economy and London functioned as a source of 
capital in times of exchange and current account 
crises.(Kindleberger, 1971). 
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London was a centre for long and short term finance because 
of international acceptance of sterling as the key currency, 
Britain's prominence in world trade and the sophistication of its 
S+er j,j}g 
banking and insurance sectors, which made Athe safest and most 
liquid international currency. British financial institutions 
played an important role in borrowing short from domestic and 
international savings and lending long to allow an expansion of 
both world trade and the size of the world market. The financial 
sector of London also provided liquidity to ease deficit crises 
since: 
"When her own funds were fully stretched she was able 
to draw on - through the mechanism of interest rates -
the liquid resources of other countries -
outstandingly European - not normally engaged in 
extensive international short-term lending. This 
continuous outflow from London had special 
significance in helping to avoid damaging dislocations 
of international trade" (Williams, 1966 p317) 
By the 1890s Britain faced increasing trade competition from 
Germany, the United States and France and the international role 
of other currencies, such as the dollar, mark and franc 
increased. In 1899 Britain's share of world manufacturing was 
about 20 per cent and its share of world exports was about 40 
per cent but by 1913 these shares had declined to about 15 and 
30 per cent respectively (M. Le Cecco, 1975). Increasingly, as 
its trade competitiveness declined, the key currency country 
became more reliant on its invisible earnings to maintain its 
international financial position, signaling the apparent 
'maturity' of its economy. (see Yoshitomi, 1987) However the 
declining ability of Britain's economy to generate trade 
surpluses weakened the pound's perceived strength. 
The gold standard ended in 1914 when the maJor economic 
powers abolished the convertibility of currency into gold because 
of the need to conserve gold stocks to finance the war. During 
this war large gold flows occurred to both the United States and 
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the united Kingdom, which held the major share of the world's 
stock of monetary gold. However, Britain's worsening external 
position due to the cost of the war destabilized its key currency 
status and meant London was unable to fully resume its 
international financial prominence, so that New York began to 
eclipse London as the world's financial centre (see table 2). As 
Kindleberger notes, changes in key currencies and leading 
financial centres seem: 
n .•. to follow a law of growth. It may take place 
slowly, in a long drawn out process, or suddenly 
because of the aggressive rise of a new centre, or the 
collapse of the old in warn (Kindleberger, 1981 p165) 
The return to the postwar gold exchange standard planned at 
the 1922 Genoa Conference led to over forty countries 
establishing currency convertibility with gold in 1925 and 
sterling remained the major international currency despite the 
strength of the US economy and the dollar. The US followed a 
policy of monetary independence reflecting its political policy 
of isolationism and Kindleberger observes that the United States: 
n .••• was uncertain of its international role .•• The one 
country capable of leadership was bemused by domestic 
concerns and stood aside •••• The instability (in the 
international monetary system) carne from 
the ..•• growing weakness of one driver, and the lack of 
sufficient interest in the other.n(Kindleberger, 
1973 p229) 
During the 1920s the united States and France appear to have 
supported the continuation of sterling as the key currency and 
London as the principal manager of the international monetary 
system. In 1925 for example, the US Federal Reserve gave the 
Bank of England a 100 million pound credit line to bolster 
sterling and in 1926 the Bank of France agreed to hold funds 1n 
London and not convert sterling funds into gold. For much of the 
decade the US also kept short term interest rates lower in New 
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TABLE 2: UK AND US INTERNATIONAL 
ASSET POSITIONS 1913-64 
SUS BILLION, END-YEAR 
1913 1920 1930 1940 1945 1950 1960 1964 
US Gold 1.3 2.5 4.3 22.0 20. 1 22.8 17.8 15.5 
holdings 
$USB 27 34 39 73 63 68 46 38 
% of world 
Foreign 0.5 0.8 2.3 3.9 6.8 13.6 21.3 28.8 
owned liquid 
dollar as sets 
(USB) 
US International 3.2 4.0 9.5 3.3 7.8 23.6 50. 1 58.0 
Investment 
position 
$USB 
UK Gold Holdings 0.2 0.8 0.7 2.8 1.6 2.9 2.8 2.1 
$USB 
% of world 4 1 1 8 9 5 9 7 5 
Foreign owned 8.0 14.0 9.8 10.9 11 .6 
liquid sterling 
assets ($USB) 
SOURCE: International Financial Statistics and Aliber (1966) 
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York than London to avoid a capital outflow which would weaken 
sterling (McCloskey, 1985). However the 1929 Depression and the 
consequent capital outflow to the united States ended the 
fragile system of fixed rates against gold, leading to the end of 
the gold standard in 1931. The end of the regime was also 
precipitated by the over valuation of sterling, perhaps by 10 per 
cent and the probable undervaluation of the franc after 1928, by 
about 25 per cent, which led to a flow of capital from London to 
Paris and destabilized the defacto key currency (Russo et aI, 
1988) . 
The weakness of the gold-exchange standard in the interwar 
years reflected both a failure of monetary and political 
leadership and a breakdown in policy harmonisation between the 
major actors, which contributed to the rise of protectionism and 
capital restrictions in the 1930s and a general decline in the 
openness of the liberal trading and financial system. The US 
policy of running export surpluses over the 1920s and 1930s 
through protectionist restrictions on imports partly closed the 
world's largest market to other countries needing liquidity to 
finance trade and service overseas loans. This policy restrained 
international use of the dollar and even in the late 1930s the US 
still used sterling for most of its international transactions. 
However international confidence ln the old key currency was 
eroded by Britain's more tenuous external economic position and 
its diminished importance in international political economy. 
After 1932 British sterling remained a major currency 
particularly in the Commonwealth trade bloc in which countries 
were required to hold sterling reserves, but was no longer 
accepted internationally as the key currency. Even in 1937 (see 
table 3) however foreign holdings of sterling assets were still 
twice as high as foreign holdings of dollars, since the us still 
used sterling for most of its international transactions (Aliber, 
1966). Continual British leadership of the sterling bloc was 
subsequently weakened by the Second World War and the liquidation 
of a major proportion of the stock of British overseas investment 
to finance the war. Thus by 1945 liquid sterling assets held by 
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foreigners were three times Britain's gold reserves, much of 
Britain's stock of overseas investment had been run down 
(Edelstein, 1982 p10) and sterling was no longer a key currency. 
Bretton Woods and the Dollar 
The Bretton Woods agreement of 1944 between the United 
States and Britain established the framework for the postwar 
monetary order and the primacy of the dollar as the international 
key currency. The regime centered on the convertibility to gold 
of the American dollar, which allowed other countries to fix 
their currencies to the dollar. Bretton Woods was 
characterised by virtually fixed exchange rates and the removal 
of restrictions on current transactions by the US initially and 
by other major Western countries after 1958. Only the US economy 
was strong enough to sustain both gold convertibility and a key 
role for its currency and furthermore the economic and political 
dominance of the United States in the postwar era made idealistic 
schemes for joint key currencies (Williams, 1947) or an 
artificial key currency, based on the 'bancor' currency unit 
impractical, (Gardner, 1986). 
Confidence in the US dollar in this period was based on the 
size and strength of the US economy, its low dependence of trade 
and consequent stability, its creditor status, (based on a 
positive merchandise trade balance) -and net capital outflows and 
the size and sophistication of its capital markets. The dollar's 
central role In the postwar international monetary system meant 
that the US was unable to directly change its own exchange 
rate, since all other currencies were pegged to the dollar. This 
rigidity limited the international flexibility of the US economy 
and the alternative policy response of deflation was never 
politically realistic once the US balance of payments slipped 
into disequlibria. 
As the key currency power since the 1940's the united States 
has been in a position to affect the global money supply and 
price level through its monetary policy, which has generally been 
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directed more towards domestic than i~ternational policy alms. 
It has therefore been able to influence the conduct of monetary 
policy in most other countries. During the 1950s and 1960s, with 
fixed exchange rates and a strong dollar, the Federal Reserve was 
able to follow a policy of 'benign neglect' since domestic 
monetary policy was stable (Kong-Yam-Tarn, 1984). In this period 
the stability of the dollar allowed other industrial countries to 
fix their exchange rates and follow dependent monetary and 
exchange rate policies. In Japan's case for example the Yen was 
fixed at Y360 =$US1 for twenty years after 1950. 
The Vietnam War however, led to a fiscal and monetary 
expansion in the late 1960s and early 1970s which forced other 
states to accept a continuing outflow of dollars and this trend 
continued under the Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan 
Administrations through either monetary expansions or trade 
deficits (see table 3). Calleo considers US economic 
policy has had increasingly deleterious effects on the global 
market economy and a failure 'to adjust America's geopolitical 
role is a principal cause of America's flawed macro-economic 
policy' (Calleo, 1988 p6). Between 1968 and 1971 the US 
Government was increasingly unwilling 'to sustain the heavy 
political costs of bringing American monetary inflation under 
control' (Ibid) and (McKinnon,1984) argues that US monetary 
policy should have been both more international and stable to 
reflect the world role of the dollar. 
Since the preservation of the Bretton Woods reglme meant a 
US policy of 'benign neglect' towards the dollar's value, 
successive administrations sought to shift the momentum of 
adjustment to the major creditor economies of West Germany and 
Japan, which were also close political allies of the United 
States. US pressure for looser monetary policy or revaluation ln 
these countries was unsuccessful in the 1960s and may have 
contributed to Nixon's 1971 decision to abrogate the US 
obligation of gold convertibility for the key currency. 
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1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1988 
TABLE 3: US BUDGET DEFICIT AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE 
1955-1988 
Military 
Expenditure 
$USB %GNP 
47.4 11.2 
53.5 9.7 
56.3 7.7 
90.4 8.4 
103.1 5.8 
134.0 5.2 
252.7 6.6 
285.4 6.4 
Budget 
Deficit 
$USB 
-3.1 
-1.4 
-2.8 
-53.2 
-73.8 
-212.3 
-146.7 
%GNP 
-0.8 
-0.2 
-0.3 
-3.4 
-2.8 
-5.4 
-3.3 
SOURCE: US Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the US, 1986, 
106th Edition, 1985 and Economic Report of the President, 1988 
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Unlike the gold-sterling standard, the fiscal and monetary 
policy of the key currency country under the Bretton Woods reglme 
influenced the world price level and built up pressure on 
exchange rate relativities. The US decided in 1960 not to use 
restrictive monetary policy, to stop the continuous fall in its 
gold stock compared to its dollar liabilities, a process driven 
initially by the expansion in world trade and the need for dollar 
reserves to finance stable growth (Triffin, 1961 p103). After 
1965 however the US expansion began to be transmitted around the 
world as inflation and dollars were created when foreign central 
banks received dollar credits in the form of Treasury Bills or 
Bonds which increased the European money supply as central banks 
issued their own currency in return for dollars (Calleo, 1982) 
p69. Most studies of this phenomenon have concluded that 
President Johnson's decision not to increase taxes to fund the 
Vietnam War increased global inflation and contributed to the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system (Johnson 1975), although 
(Triffin , 1979 p275) considers its collapse was inevitable, given 
the lack of constraints on the balance of payments performance of 
the key currency country. In MCKinnon's view the Bretton Woods 
order broke down because changing relative price structures 
between countries were no longer reflected by the structure of 
fixed exchange rates . (McKinnon, 1984) 
The dollar ' s value was under pressure in the late 1960s as 
the volume of dollars held overseas increased but an erosion of 
its value was arrested by US political pressure on Germany and 
Japan to buy US securities and avoid the conversion of surplus 
dollars into gold. For their part the major creditor economies 
continued to accept dollars to avoid appreciation of their 
currencies against the dollar and to protect their export sectors. 
These continuing dollar outflows in the late 1960s and early 
1970s vastly increased international reserves and helped 
destabilise the dollar's value. 
In 1965 President De Gaulle attacked the US for its 
' exhorbitant privilege' in being able to print international 
currency and claimed, probably correctly, that the US was 
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exporting inflation to Europe. The French view was that the 
Bretton Woods regime seemed to sanction endless US balance of 
payments deficits and should therefore have replaced by a more 
stable and 'neutral' gold standard (Rueff 1964 p30). 
From the perspective of the US, the increase in the volume 
of dollars held by other countries was natural given the central 
banking role being performed by the US economy, 1n providing 
short-term dollar securities to help finance world trade growth. 
The European countries considered, however, that the US was 
abusing its key currency role by running perpetual deficits. 
Triffin (Triffin 1988 p275) considers that US fiscal expansion 
and the purchase of excess dollars by central banks and private 
institutions transferred the cost of the Vietnam War to the other 
major economies, although this is disputed by (Williamson 1977 
p153). 
Although the dollar was officially convertible to gold until 
1971, the US Government effectively barred private conversion 
after 1968 and discouraged official conversions, so as to 
conserve its gold stock. Thus after 1968 the gold constraint on 
the creation of fiduciary liquidity was ineffective and Gresham's 
law ceased to apply for dollar assets, while previously any 
increase in the fiduciary component of dollar reserves was 
nominally limited by gold convertibility (see table 4). 
The US's official liquidity ratio (official 
reserves/liabilities to foreigners) fell from 212 per cent in 
1959 to 95 per cent in 1967, 72 per cent in 1970 and 40 per cent 
in 1971 as holdings of dollars by non-residents increased in a 
similar way to~ euild up of liquidity under the sterling standard, 
when the liquidity ratio for Britain in 1913 fell to 38 per cent 
(Odell 1982 p112). It seems that the key currency power's 
official liquidity ratio falls inevitably as an overhang builds 
up and Keohane and Nye (1977) hypothesise that a fall in this 
share indicates a decline in relative power, but the central 
monetary power still has an ability to change the rules or borrow 
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YEAR 
1949 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1987 
TABLE 4: US GOLD RESERVES AND OFFICIAL LIABILITIES, 
US BILLION 
GOLD 
RESERVES 
( 1 ) 
24.6 
21.8 
17.8 
14. 1 
11 .0 
11.3 
11 .2 
1 1 • 1 
OFFICIAL 
LIABILITIES 
(2) (a) 
6.9 
13.5 
21.0 
29.6 
47.0 
126.0 
500.8 
1536.0 
RATIO 
(2: 1 ) 
0.3 
0.6 
1.2 
2.1 
4.2 
11.2 
44.7 
138.4 
SOURCE: IMF, International Financial Statistics 
(a) Official liabilities defined as foreign official holdings of US 
Government securities and other assets in the US 
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to maintain reserves and confidence in the key currency (Odell, 
1982). 
Over the period of Bretton Woods US monetary and fiscal 
expansion vastly increased both the stock of dollars held outside 
the US and the world money stock and this inflationary wave could 
not be completely sterilized by surplus countries, which bore a 
large share of the burden of adjustment. The US was thereby 
able to pursue an active international policy, beyond the 
apparent limits of its national resources )but the continuing 
build up in the dollar overhang led to a decline in us official 
reserves (from 40% of world reserves in 1957 to 8% in 1972) and a 
cr1S1S in dollar-gold convertibility which eventually led to a 
crisis of confidence in the dollar standard and the fixed 
exchange regime. (Russo, 1988) 
The Floating Dollar 
The breakdown of Bretton Woods and the switch to a floating 
exchange rate regime in 1971 followed President Nixon's decision 
in that year to officially suspend the dollar's convertibility 
into gold. It marked the beginning of a pure dollar standard 
based primarily on the continuing dominance of the US economy, 
general acceptance of the dollar as the key currency and 
confidence in the relatively unrestricted American financial 
system. Moreover the overwhelming use of the dollar in n ormal 
trade and financial transactions and also in the Eurocurrency 
markets gave support to the new regime. 
The 1971 dollar devaluation caused a short-term boost to 
American competitiveness, which may have assisted Nixon's 
re-election in 1972 but was not welcomed by Western Europe or 
Japan. Strange (1976) and Gowa (1983) consider the move to a 
floating dollar regime underlined US monetary hegemony, since the 
unilateral action of closing the gold window was equivalent to 
defaulting on a loan, but it 1S arguable that the openness of 
the US economy to investment helped support the value o f foreign 
dollar balances. Calleo (1982 p98) observes that the end of t he 
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fixed rate regime merely 'legitimised the dollar's weakness 
rather than ended it' because the worsening trend in the US 
balance of payments was to lead to recurrent cycles of dollar 
depreciation. Odell (1982) suggests that the 1971 decision 
reduced the US's power to influence the system, since it 
renounced the main prop for the gold-exchange standard, but this 
conclusion seems to underestimate the continued US dominance of 
the monetary system after Bretton Woods. 
Since 1971 there have been three major swings in the value 
of the US dollar (Feldstein, 1988 p11) with the decline in the 
dollar's value from the mid to late 1970s , its appreciation 
until March 1985 and its depreciation thereafter. The first two 
changes were primarily due to oscillations in US monetary 
policy, beginning with a rapid monetary growth relative to output 
in the late 1960s and followed by the 1974-75 recession to 
revitalise employment and output. The first surge in money 
supply led to the 1971 abrogation of convertibility and the 
second led to US inflation and a depreciation of 16 per cent in 
the dollar from 1976 to 1979. After President Carter appointed 
Volcker to the Federal Reserve US interest rates rose markedly 
and a dollar crisis was averted but an adjustment to fiscal 
policy which Volcker saw as an essential part of monetary 
restraint, did not occur. Indeed the Reagan Administration 
introduced tax reform measures at the same time as it increased 
defence expenditure, leading to a series of historically high 
trade and fiscal deficits in the 1980s and a vast accumulation of 
foreign debt (see table 5). 
The third sWlng, a decline in the dollar's value after 1985, 
occurred because of declining US competitiveness in world trade 
and an increase in US indebtedness, but its trigger was the 
Reagan Administration's decision to force a devaluation of the 
dollar against the Yen and other currencies so as to revitalise 
the US trade position and force down the Japanese current 
account surplus. The Yen-Dollar Committee of the US and Japanese 
Finance Ministers (Awamura, 1988 pp2-8) recommended an adjustment 
of exchange rates in 1984 and its report was consequently 
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YEAR 
1980 
1983 
1985 
1987 
1988 
TABLE 5: US FEDERAL DEFICIT, DEBT AND INTEREST 
$US BILLION 
DEFICIT DEBT INTEREST ON DEBT 
59.6 914.3 52.5 
195.4 1381.9 87.8 
212.3 1827.5 129.0 
150.4 2355.3 166.7 
146.7 (a) 2581.6 (a) 182.7 (a) 
SOURCE: Economic Report of the President, 1988 
(a) estimate 
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endorsed in the 1985 Plaza Accord between the seven leading 
industrial economles. This decision reinforced market sentiment 
and led to a sharp revaluation of the yen against the dollar. 
Over the period from 1918 to the mid 1970s and especially 
after World War II, the US current account balance was in surplus 
and its overseas asset holdings continued to grow, financed by an 
outflow of capital for most of the period except the early 1930s. 
The rising trend of deficits in the 1980s has however reversed 
the US's creditor status, as the total value of foreign holdings 
of assets in the US began to exceed the total value of holdings 
of US citizens of similar assets overseas. The decline of the 
key currency power to international debtor status has affected 
international confidence in the soundness of the dollar standard, 
even though a major part of world trade and finance is still 
denominated in dollars and most US foreign debt is denominated 
and serviced in dollars. 
The resilience of the dollar standard has both economic 
and political roots due to the large size of the US market, the 
vvorid 
traditional predominance of the US in the ~ financial system and 
the political role of the US in maintaining a security system for 
most free market economies, including the second and third 
largest economies of Japan and West Germany. The reluctance of 
these states to further internationalize their currencies in 
recent years has made the dollar the key currency by default 
since no heir apparent or co-key currency has been available to 
help stabilise the international monetary system. This antipathy 
towards a more international role for their currencies by West 
Germany and Japan, at least up until the mid-1980s, is partly due 
to the vulnerability of their economies to international capital 
flows or changes in US fiscal or monetary policies. As Calleo 
(1982 p85) notes, foreign investors have continued to support the 
US dollar for economic reasons of market stability and political 
reasons of security and regional unity. 
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Emergence of the Yen 
Japan's rise over the postwar period to its current position 
as the world's second largest market economy, after the United 
States, has led to a more prominent role for the yen 1n 
international trade and finance. The yen's position however is 
not yet commensurate with Japan's economic importance and the 
dollar is still used as the main vehicle currency for its trade 
and financial transactions. In 1986 the ratio of yen denominated 
trade for Japanese exports and imports was around 36 and 10 per 
cent respectively and these shares have been relatively unchanged 
in the 1980s, although the import share rose from a negligible 
level at the beginning of the decade (see tables 6 and 7). In 
contrast West Germany's currency is used to denominate 80 per 
cent of its export transactions and 50 per cent of its imports 
(see table 8 ), a trend which developed after the 
internationalisation of the Deutschmark as a strong, stable 
vehicle in the 1960s. Unlike the existing key currency, the yen 
is virtually unused as a medium for trade or finance between 
third countries. 
Currently most of Japan's imports of commodities of raw 
materials such as minerals, metals and petroleum are denominated 
in American dollars, a situation which reflects the traditional 
predominance of the American market for these goods and world 
acceptance of the dollar as the key currency. The dollar 
denomination of world trade 1n petroleum also appears to be 
linked with the US's long term geopolitical role in overseeing 
security in the Middle East. 
Use of the yen to denominate Japanese exports is increasing 
gradually but the predominant share of the US market for these 
exports inhibits a major change from dollar to yen invoiced trade. 
Nevertheless the yen 1S more frequently used for exports to other 
countries, particularly those in Japan's immediate region, as can 
be seen in table 5. The growing importance of Japanese trade 
with the Newly Industralising Countries such as South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and China is likely to lead to 
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YEAR (a) 
1975 
1980 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
TABLE 6: THE RATIO OF YEN-DENOMINATED TRADE 
(per cent) 
EXPORTS IMPORTS 
17 . 5 0.9 
29.4 2.4 
32.2 na 
34.5 na 
33.7 na 
35.9 7.3 
35.5 9.7 
33.8 11 . 6 
(a) Fiscal Year 
Source: Exports MOF (up to 1985) MITI (after 1986) Imports MITI 
Figures up to 1986 taken from M. Fujii, (1987) 
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TABLE 7: RATIO OF YEN AND $US DENOMINATED JAPANESE EXPORTS BY 
COMMODITY, 1986 
(per cent) 
COMMODITY $US YEN OTHERS 
Food 75 22 3 
Textiles 73 23 4 
Chemicals 71 21 9 
Non-metalic 56 41 4 
mineral 
manufactures 
Metal manufactures 79 18 3 
Iron & Steel 89 9 2 
Machinery & Equipment 44 45 1 1 
Other 63 34 12 
TOTAL 54 36 9 
Source: MITI and Fujii (1986) 
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TABLE 8: EXTERNAL ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF JAPAN 
AND WEST GERMANY DENOMINATED IN NATIONAL CURRENCY 
A. External Assets 
Japan 
(end 1985) 
West Germany 
(June 1984) 
(per cent) 
Short term 
1 9.4 
35.8 
B. External Liabilities 
Japan 
(end 1985) 
West Germany 
(June 1984) 
30.4 
66.3 
Long term Total 
44.9 37.3 
51 .3 45.0 
76.1 49.7 
86.4 77.9 
Source: Soichiro Akahane, "The Internationalisation of the Yen", 
Bank of Tokyo, Tokyo Financial Review, Vol II, No. 10, October 
1986, p.5 
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increased use of the Yen to denominate regional trade 
(Department of Trade, 1987). In particular Japan's rising 
imports of manufactures could more easily be denominated in yen 
than commodity imports, which are conventionally valued in 
dollars. Closer integration of Japan into its own region and a 
less disproportionate reliance on the US market could therefore 
further internationalise the yen as a trading currency (see table 
9). In this regard Nobuyuki Ueda, Chairman of the Long Term 
Credit Bank of Japan commented that: 
"Economic integration between Japan and Asian nations 
has grown very rapidly. If a common market in the 
East Asian region emerges similar to the 
European Community, in a real sense, then we think 
that the Yen will playa significant role as a 
currency of settlement and as a reserve currency. So 
the Yen will become more internationalised." 
(Suzuki, 1987) 
The continual instability in the dollar's value, and the 
possibility of its depreciation against the yen has been a 
disincentive to importers switching to yen denominated contracts 
from 1975, since the real (yen) cost of dollar-invoiced imports, 
falls with the dollar. Hence Australian coal exporters have been 
unable to persuade Japanese buyers to invoice in yen, since the 
exchange rate risk is held by the commodity exporter. 
Similarly Japanese exporters have been more reluctant to invoice 
ln yen because of the need to maintain export market shares and 
remain competitive. As a result of these trends the proportion 
of Japanese imports in yen has remained at only 10 per cent and 
the proportion of exports in yen actually fell in 1987 to 34 per 
cent from its share of 40 per cent in 1985. 
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TABLE 9: JAPANESE EXPORTS BY REGION AND CURRENCY DENOMINATION 
(%, 1986) 
US DOLLAR YEN OTHERS 
Industrial Countries 50. 1 34.3 15.7 
North America 79.0 18.6 2.4 
- US 82. 1 17.8 0.1 
V€stern Europe 8.2 54. 1 37.7 
- EC 7.9 51.5 40.6 
Developing Countries 58.8 39.5 1.6 
- South-East As ia 59.3 39.0 1.6 
- Western Asia 59.9 38.2 1.9 
- latin America 64.3 35.3 0.4 
- Africa (excluding 
South Africa) 37. 1 58.8 4.1 
Communist Bloc 62.0 36.7 2.3 
TOTAL 54.3 36.6 9.2 
SOURCE: Fujii (1987) and MITI 
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Nevertheless, most observers consider that uncertainty 1n 
the dollar necessitates a greater role for the other major 
currencies, such as the mark and the yen and although this has 
been traditionally resisted by the monetary authorities of West 
Germany and Japan, holders of these currencies currently bear the 
exchange risk of fluctuations in the value of the dollar key 
currency. 
Use of the Yen in International Finance 
The liberalisation of Japan's financial markets in the 1980s ) 
partly in response to the US pressure, is gradually increasing 
the use of the yen in international finance and as an asset in 
international reserves. The yen is gaining ground especially in 
the international bond market since regulations governing the 
issue of yen denominated bonds in the Euromarket were relaxed in 
1984 and as Japanese banks have become more prominent in both the 
Eurobond and Eurocurrency markets. In the international bond 
market the share of yen denominated bonds (bonds issued by non 
residents) has risen steadily in the 1980s while the share of US 
dollar bonds began to deteriorate after 1985 and fell sharply 
from 55 per cent of the market in 1986 to 37 per cent in 1987 
(see table 10). During this period the yen bond market share 
rose to 14 per cent by 1987 and other currencies became more 
frequently used to diversify the exchange rate risk of either 
dollar or yen denominated bonds. 
According to a 1989 survey by the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS) the role of the US dollar in international 
finance declined between 1983 and 1988 and the dollar share of 
cross border lending of banks in industrial countries fell from 
72 to 53 per cent over this period. Similarly the share of the 
dollar in all banking claims declined from 76 per cent in 1983 to 
58 per cent in 1988 while the share of dollar liabilities fell 
from 72 to 61 per cent. The BIS (1989) noted that yen 
denominated banking claims rose fro m 3.4 to 7.4 per cent over the 
period 1983-88, due partly to global financial deregulation which 
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Euromarket Issues 
US Dollar 
German Mark 
Japanese Yen 
British Pound 
ECU 
TOTAL 
Domestic Market 
US Dollar 
Swiss Franc 
German Mark 
Japanese Yen 
British Pound 
Total 
Total 
US Dollar 
SWiss Franc 
German Mark 
Japanese Yen 
British Pound 
ECU 
TOTAL 
TABLE 10: INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES 
(BILLION $US) 
1983 1984 1985 
384 636 978 
38 46 95 
2 12 65 
19 40 58 
20 30 70 
485 795 1367 
45 55 47 
143 126 150 
27 22 17 
38 46 64 
8 12 10 
278 280 310 
430 691 1024 
143 126 150 
65 68 112 
40 58 129 
28 53 67 
20 30 70 
763 1074 1678 
1986 
1191 
171 
185 
106 
71 
1887 
68 
232 
52 
3 
394 
1259 
232 
171 
237 
106 
71 
2281 
Source: Morgan G,Lcranty Trust Company 'World Financial Market" 
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1987 
567 
155 
231 
150 
74 
1405 
59 
240 
31 
368 
626 
240 
155 
262 
150 
74 
1773 
has diversified the international use of the other 
currenCles. Other factors contributing to this change include 
the declining role of US banks and the growth of Japan's regional 
trade, which has a higher level of yen denomination. Lower 
interest rates outside the US have also increased borrowing 
demand for non-dollar currencies while Third World debt 
reductions have led to a switch out of dollar denominated debt. 
While the proportion of international bond issues made in 
yen has almost doubled since 1985, it is worth noting that most 
Euroyen bonds are still issued and purchased by Japanese 
financial institutions as a means of avoiding the remaining 
regulations in the domestic bond market. Hence international 
demand for yen denominated bonds is increasing but has not yet 
forced a dramatic change in the relative share of dollar and yen 
bonds in the international market. In international bank lending 
and in the international bond market the yen is therefore 
becoming more attractive, but the stock of bank loans and 
international bonds is still mainly denominated in dollars. Even 
for Japan's portfolio of overseas investment, dollar denominated 
financial assets are generally used as a store of value and the 
proportion of dollar bonds and equities is over 85 per cent. 
The yen has only become an accepted international currency 
in the 1980s and is still not significant as a reserve currency 
but the instability of the dollar as the key currency and the 
size of the Japanese economy, which is also the world's largest 
creditor, suggest that the yen's role will increase. The process 
of internationalising the yen is reinforcing this trend and 
Governor Sumita of the Bank of Japan noted recently that; 
"I believe it would be realistic ...• to consider ways 
of diversifying reserve currencies to complement the 
dollar's role, facilitating the financing of resource 
for market intervention and dispensing the exchange 
rate risk among reserve currencies ...• Consisten t with 
this, Japan has been steadily removing the domestic 
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financial barriers that would impede the use of the 
Yen as an international currency" (Sumita, 1988) 
A greater reserve role of the yen could take some time, but 
the yen is likely to become a major reserve currency as the stock 
of more liquid yen denominated assets increases. Such a role for 
the yen is only possible if it is used more in world trade and 
finance since monetary authorities rely on dollar intervention to 
influence their exchange rates, given the dominance of dollars in 
trade and particularly capital flows. Hence the dollar still 
accounts for 69 per cent of world reserves while the deutschmark 
share is 15 per cent and the yen share in 1989 was still only 7 
per cent (see table 11). 
Overall these trends suggest the yen is becoming a more 
international currency which could eventually challenge the 
dollar's key role in the international monetary system, but both 
economic and political processes affect the selection of a key 
currency. 
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1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
TABLE 11: SHARE OF NATIONAL CURRENCIES IN OFFICIAL HOLDINGS OF 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE (END YEARS) 
SUS OM YEN SF 
71.5 11.9 4.9 2.4 
69.5 12.6 5.7 2.1 
64.5 15.3 7.5 2.3 
66.6 14.8 6.9 1.6 
SOURCE: IMF 
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4. THE DOLLAR AND THE YEN 
Over the postwar period the united States has remained the 
world's dominant economy and the dollar has been the c urrency 
used to denominate most international trade and finance flows. 
Since the 1940s and 1950s the US share of world production and 
trade has fallen because of the recovery and growth of Wester n 
Europe and Japan, but in the 1980s the US still accounted for 25% 
of world trade, about 
and nearly twice that 
the US has been the de 
the same share as the European Commun i ty 
of Japan (Drysdale 1988). In these decades 
mqna~et' 
facto Aof ~he international monetary system 
although this responsibility may have been increasingly shared 
with other major economies such as Japan and West Germany. 
During the Bretton Woods regime and the post-1971 system of 
floating exchange rates, the dollar continued as the key currency 
because of the size of the US economy and the absence of a n 
alternative candidate for this role. Both West Germany and Japan 
have continued to support the key role of the dollar, partly 
because of their traditional political and strategic ties with 
the US and the high level of economic interdependence between 
these major economies. Monetary authorities in the second and 
third largest market economies have also been reluctant to risk 
exposure to international capital flows by further 
internationalising their currencies and have t herefore not sought 
to directly challenge the continuation of the dollar standard. 
More recently economic and political changes have eroded t h e 
dollar's hegemonic position. The 1979 agreement on monetary 
co-operation in the European Community established the ECU as a 
major reserve currency in Europe and monetary integration in the 
EC, hitherto blocked by Britain, could establish the ECU as a 
challenger to the dollar. Similarly the economic success o f 
Japan and its increased prominence in world trade and fi nance 
provide the basis for more widespread use of the yen as an 
international currency and possibl y as a new key currency. Thes e 
33 
trends have been reinforced by the worsening trade performance of 
the US ~ its decline into international debtor status and the 
J 
remarkable surpluses achieved by both Japan and West Germany in 
the 1980s. 
An important factor in the determination of new monetary 
system is the natural reluctance of the US, as the key currency 
power to relinquish monetary hegemony, even though its decline to 
debtor status may be destabilizing the foundation of monetary 
order. As Strange observes: 
"The top currency State seems inclined to develop a 
strong political/economic ideology that asserts that 
its domestic and international interests are 
co-incident if not identical" (Strange 1971 p229) 
Consequently, domestic priorities may be weighted more 
highly by the key currency country than its international 
responsibility to maintain a stable value for its currency ) the 
value of which is directly affected by exogenous trade shocks and 
capital flows, transmitted to the central economy. For the 
US,which has a low trade/GOP ratio, such shocks have been 
absorbed more easily than would be possible for a smaller 
economy, but it is clear that the sensitivity and vulnerability 
of the key currency country is increasing. 
For smaller major economies such as Japan and West Germany, 
fear of increased vulnerability to external monetary shocks has 
been a major reason to avoid both a key currency role for their 
currencies, or a greater role in international monetary 
management. The West German experience 1n 1969, of a massive 
inflow of speculative capital which led to a 25% increase in the 
German money supply in one week, for example, reinforced the 
reluctance of its monetary authorities to take a higher profile 
in international monetary affairs (Cooper, 1984 p171). Japanese 
authorities traditionally took a similar approach in discouraging 
the internationalisation of the yen (Horne, 1984). 
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Nevertheless Japan is no longer a small economy and its 
large savings and current account surpluses provide a buffer to 
the greater exposure and international responsibility which a yen 
standard would bring. Although the US economy and market is 
larger than that of Japan, total savings in Japan is nearly five 
times greater that in the US, thus providing a stable base for a 
more international currency regime and allowing Japan to already 
perform some of the functions expected of the key currency power 
(Yoshitomi, 1989 p10). 
Although the dollar is still the principal currency used in 
world trade and finance its dominance has declined somewhat in 
recent years and the yen has become more internationally accepted. 
The implications of these potential changes on the US and Japan 
will be discussed in the next section. 
US-Japan Interdependence 
Together the United States and Japan account for nearly 40 
per cent of world production, 30 per cent of world trade and a 
significant degree of interdependence exists between the two 
economies as the US is the market for almost 40 per cent of 
Japanese exports, while over one third of the US budget deficit 
is funded by Japanese financial institutions (Drysdale, 1988). 
This interdependence affects the rest of the world economy, 
particularly since the US and Japan account for nearly 75 per 
cent of world stock and bond market values, half of all bank 
lending and 80 per cent of reserve assets are denominated in 
their currencies (Burstein, 1989). 
These close ties have been facilitated by the US's open 
door policy for Japanese exports and by the US military and 
strategic presence in Japan's region, which has arguable allowed 
Japan a 'free ride', through relatively low defence expenditure 
and a political and economic environment conducive to Japan's 
economic expansion. 
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The use of the dollar almost exclusively ln bilateral trade 
and financial flows and as the denominator of most of Japan's 
external assets is a significant factor in the relationship, 
particularly since that country's trade competitiveness and 
overseas investments are sensitive to changes in the dollar's 
value. To Gilpin the importance of the US-Japan relationship for 
international relations: 
" .•. resides ln the fact that the dollar is the 
keystone of the US world position. Along with the 
extension of America's nuclear deterrent over its 
Japanese and European allies, the role of the dollar 
as the key currency in the international monetary 
system has cemented its system of global alliances and 
has been the foundation of American hegemony" (Gilpin, 
1988 p119). 
It would seem however that US monetary hegemony is 
increasingly under challenge and the key currency country has 
developed a greater level of interdependence than in the past 
with other major players in the floating dollar regime and 
especially with Japan, which limit its ability to unilaterally 
change the international monetary system. 
The extent of increased US interdependence may have been 
revealed in April 1987 when Secretary Baker suggested the Louvre 
Accord did not rule out a further fall in the dollar, a statement 
heavily criticized in Japan. The subsequent fall in demand by 
Japanese institutions for US Treasury Bonds may have pushed long 
term rates up by one point and Baker subsequently accepted the 
need for maintenance of existing dollar yen values, although the 
causality of these events is unclear (Burstein, 1988). Similarly 
the stock market crash of October 1987 may have been precipitated 
by a withdrawal of Japanese capital (Economist January 1989)and 
this event has been described by Krause as a 'watershed' in the 
evolution of the international economy since: 
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"From a longer perspective, future historians may note 
that the events of that day began to convince the 
market that the dollar no longer could serve as the 
key currency of the international monetary system" 
(Krause, 1988 p 1) 
While a r1se 1n US protectionism would affect bilateral 
relations, the most likely danger for international monetary 
stability appears to be that a sharp fall in Japanese investment 
in US bonds could cause a loss of confidence in the US dollar and 
a world recession as stock markets collapsed and monetary 
contraction occurred. However it is not clear that Japan's 
current account surplus could be easily shifted from the US and 
invested in other financial instruments or markets, so that Japan 
too would suffer in such a financial crisis. 
Most of Japanese overseas investment Slnce the removal or 
partial lifting of controls on capital outflows in the early 
1980s, has been in short term securities such as US Treasury 
Bonds (see table 12). The advantage of these instruments for 
investors is their security and convenience, as high interest 
rates on these Bonds are a hedge against exchange rate changes, 
while Japan's capital outflow of over $80 billion annually could 
not be recycled as direct investment because of the political 
friction which would occur. 
Continued instability in the dollar or a liquidity crisis in 
Japan, if the Nikkei Index collapsed, could lead to a capital 
outflow from these short term securities regardless of further 
rises in US interest rates and recreate a shrinkage of liquidity 
of the type which occurred in 1929 when the US stock market 
collapsed and US overseas investment was recalled (see 
Kindleberger, 1978). In the event of a dollar crisis affecting 
the value of their portfolio investments, Japanese institutions 
would have to choose, either to continue to support the dollar, 
or to sellout to avoid further losses. Such a crisis could also 
occur if the US defaulted on its overseas debts or froze interest 
payments (Burstein 1989 p16) but the probability of this scenar10 
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TABLE 12: LONG TERM OUTFLOWS OF JAPANESE CAPITAL ($USM) 
Calendar Direct 
Year Invest-
ments 
1971 360 
1972 723 
1973 1904 
1974 2012 
1975 1763 
1976 1991 
1977 1645 
1978 2371 
1979 2898 
1980 2385 
1981 4894 
1982 4540 
1983 3612 
1984 5965 
1985 6452 
1986 14480 
1987 19519 
Trade 
Credits 
863 
324 
1048 
672 
29 
571 
1388 
142 
-1288 
717 
2731 
3239 
2589 
4937 
2817 
1836 
535 
Loans Securities Others 
594 195 219 
1684 1188 1101 
3038 1787 691 
1136 1 41 102 
1295 24 281 
1525 146 326 
472 1718 24 
6299 5300 760 
8102 5865 717 
2553 3753 1409 
5083 8777 1324 
7902 9743 1994 
8425 16024 1809 
11922 30795 3156 
10427 59773 2346 
9218 101977 4521 
16190 87757 8829 
2/.31 
5020 
8468 
4063 
3392 
4559 
5247 
14872 
16294 
10817 
22809 
27418 
32459 
56775 
81815 
132095 
132830 
1988 43210 6939 15211 86949 6574 149883 
Source: Bank of Japan, Balance of Payments Monthly, No. 273, 
April 1989, p 61. A positive sign indicates a capital outflow 
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appears low in the foreseeable future particularly as US debt 
repayments account for only 14 per cent of export earnings and 
total foreign debt 1S only 6 per cent US GNP (Economic Report to 
the President, 1989). 
Even without a crisis, which would test Japan's apparent 
role as creditor of last resort, funding of the US twin deficits 
cannot continue indefinitely and is unlikely to increase markedly. 
A Vice Minister of the Ministry of Finance Mr. Gyohten, recently 
warned that, while there was no 'immediate' reason for Japanese 
investors to stop buying US Treasury Bonds; 
and 
" ••. the overwhelming attraction of the instrument is 
waning and the volatility of investment (has) 
increased"; 
" ... if investor confidence in (the) stability and 
strength of the US dollar is not replenished, the 
recent development seems to be gradually fermenting a 
greater risk of interruption, in the event of a sudden 
deterioration of market sentiment" (Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 9 March 1989) 
While it is questionable whether a sharp change in the level 
of Japanese portfolio and direct investment in the US is likely 
to occur, given the absence of large alternative financial 
markets for the current account surplus, the continued 
development of Tokyo as a world financial market could allow its 
eventual redirection as direct and portfolio investment to other, 
more capital poor countries. 
The need for US monetary authorities to maintain high 
interest rates to attract foreign portfolio investment to finance 
the trade and budget deficits imposes constraints on domestic 
economic policy choices 1n the US, although not yet on the size 
of these deficits. The US is therefore insulated to some extent 
from balance of payments problems, by virtue of the dollar's key 
currency role, and has greater freedom adjusting to changing 
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trade competitiveness. Nevertheless the US debt burden is 
increasing US interdependence and " ... slows down the process by 
which policy authorities are able to reach domestic objectives" 
(Cooper, 1968 p32). 
A continual growth in the US's overseas debt burden, while 
the dollar remains the key currency, 1S likely to affect the 
stability of the international monetary system and jeopardise the 
dollar's role since international confidence in the currency will 
decline. On this point Suzuki observes that: 
"Like the rowboat that ferries a giant elephant there 
is the possibility that the slightest trouble in the 
American economy, which will be occupied by debt 
management, will cause the international currency 
system to pitch and roll due to the acceptance 
accorded the key international currency" (Suzuki, 
1987) 
Similarly many Americans are concerned over the US's 
increased dependence on Japanese capital inflows and Bergsten 
concludes that "The most important implication of this deep 
Japanese penetration of America will be a further increase in the 
interdependence of the countries" (Bergsten, 1987). Another 
interpretation of these trends is that the US is moving from 
interdependence to dependence as it loses control over interest 
rates, the value of the dollar, financing of US government 
budgets and the trade account. Burstein for example predicts 
that Japan is becoming a global superpower in its own right with 
undue influence over the US economy (Burstein, 1989). 
A less radical V1ew of US-Japan interdependence is that both 
countries benefit from their high level of economic integration 
and have a mutual i terest in avoiding a monetary crisis. It is 
also possible to argue, that the multi-faceted nature of US power 
gives support to the stability of the world economy (Strange, 
1985), but this proposition is being increasingly tested as US 
indebtedness rises and the dollar standard weakens. 
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Internationalisation of the Yen 
During the first three postwar de cades the Japanese 
Government actively discouraged the use of the yen as an 
international currency through regulations on the financial 
sector and controls on capital flows into and from Japan. The 
stability of the fixed exchange rate system of Bretton Woods and 
US monetary policy allowed Japan to follow passive monetary 
and exchange rate policies and controls insulated the domestic 
money and capital markets from speculation and non-residen t use 
of the yen as an international vehicle or reserve currency. 
For most of the postwar period the Japanese Government 
deliberately kept the yen undervalued at a fixed value to the 
dollar to protect domestic industry and encourage export growth. 
By the 1970s Japan had emerged as a surplus economy, although 
this was disguised by the two oil crises, and the US began to 
call for increased market access into Japan and revaluation of 
the yen against the dollar to reduce bilateral trade imbalances. 
The end of Bretton Woods in 1971 and the move to a flo a ting 
system after 1973 began to expose the Yen to market forces but 
Japanese authorities continued to resist appreciation so as to 
maintain export competitiveness and external balance. In the 
period 1974 to 1976, for example, the Ministry of Finance was 
reluctant to allow the issue of Yen denominated securities 
through the Yen bond market, since this could lead to speculat i ve 
pressure on the Yen. As a result the bond market was closed 
until international pressure, particularly from the US, led to 
its re-opening (Horne, 1984 p187). 
Over the 1970s the continual worsenlng in the US-Japan t rade 
balance led US policy makers to increasingly call for a mor e 
international Yen and more open financial and trade mar kets In 
Japan (Solarz, 1983). Increased US pressure for Japanese 
financial reform seems to have helped the Japanese Government t o 
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overcome domestic obstacles to change and proceed with 
deregulation. One of the first steps came in 1980 when capital 
flows between Japan and the rest of the world were no longer 
prohibited in principle and the Government officially recognised 
the need to internationalise the yen. Another incentive to 
deregulate Japan's financial markets has been the continued 
reliance of the central government on deficit financing since 
around 1974. The large lncrease in government bonds issued to 
domestic institutions to finance these deficits has been absorbed 
only with increasing difficulty, particularly given the low fixed 
interest rates on this paper and the lack of a rediscount 
facility. As Finance Minister in 1976 and Prime Minister in 1978 
Ohira began to support a more international role for the Yen, 
partly to assist deficit financing (Horne, 1984 p185). Prime 
Minister Ohira favoured the emergence of the Yen as a support 
currency for the dollar, together with the Deutschmark but the 
Ministry of Finance suspended its support for this policy after 
the second oil crisis in 1979. 
The 1984 Report of the US-Japan Yen-Dollar Committee on 
Liberalisation and Internationalisation of the Japanese Financial 
Market recommended that the pace of reform be speeded up by 
correcting the bilateral exchange rate and reducing official 
controls on finance and capital. The bilateral acceptance 
of the report marked a significant change in the attitude of both 
the US and Japanese Government to a more international role for 
the Yen. 
The emergence of a more international yen is possible 
however only if other countries accept such a role for the 
currency. The development of the yen as a more international 
currency depends on the demand for yen to purchase Japanese goods 
and services and on the availability of yen denominated financial 
assets to reinforce the currency's value. For the Yen to become 
a more international medium of exchange and reserve asset, it 
appears that further regulatory barriers in Japan need to be 
removed to allow free transfer of funds and a deeper market in 
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financial assets such as Eurobonds and Euroyen although 
considerable liberalisation has already taken place. 
A substantial obstacle to internationalisation of the yen is 
the insufficient market for short term securities in Japan which 
prevents effective access to yen assets by international 
borrowers. The currency risk of yen denominated loans, because 
of that currency's continued long-run appreciation against the 
dollar, has also limited demand for such funds. Proper 
development of the short term and long term securities markets in 
Japan and an increase in Euroyen deposits would also allow Japan 
to recycle its trade surplus and high level of savings more 
effectively. Some short term government securities in the form 
of discount bonds have been issued by public tender Slnce 
February 1986 but the market is still not deep enough to offset 
the scarcity of yen financial assets. The supply of stable, high 
quality yen denominated financial assets is a natural function of 
a country issuing an international currency (Suzuki, 1987). 
One step towards a more international Yen would be a Pacific 
Yen Currency block, which would create a currency area insulated 
from fluctuations in the American dollar and provide efficiency 
galns through the use of a single stable currency over a large 
area. If such an area was established Japan would need to playa 
larger role in maintaining world monetary order, through 
stabilizing outflows of capital and policy co-ordination with the 
US (Inoguchi, 1988 Ch4). Such a yen region would be comparable 
to the European Monetary System which maintains a stable 'snake' 
of linked currencies, relative to fluctuations in the key 
currency. The emergence of a stronger yen bloc in Japan's region 
is becoming more likely as the opening up of the Japanese market 
for imports begins to rival the larger US market, which may be 
partly closed in the future is a revival of protectionism occurs 
because of the US's large trade imbalances. The creation of a 
yen bloc could also be a first step in the development of either 
a co-key currency regime or a new key currency order. 
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Currently dollar denominated financial assets are generally 
used as a store of value for Japanese overseas holdings and the 
proportion of dollar bonds and equities in Japanese foreign 
portfolios 1S probably around 85-90%, with bonds around 65-70%. 
In export transactions about one third of Japan's trade 1S 
denominated in yen and about 10% of its imports ) a share which 
have risen slightly over the 1980s. In financial transactions 
yen is also becoming more important and a rapid increase has 
occurred in Euroyen loans by Japanese banks and Yen denominated 
bonds have become more common. 
The Yen as a Key Currency 
Acceptance of the Yen as a key currency, supplementing or 
eventually supplanting the dollar, is dependent upon 
international support for such a role. The strength of the 
Japanese economy and the size and depth of its financial and 
capital markets provide a firm foundation for an increasing 
international role for the Yen but the dollar's current dominance 
has support in the US's political and strategic position as well 
as its economic size. Hence any transition to a Yen key currency 
system is likely to be gradual. Certainly Japan's increased 
importance in the world economy and the continuing liberalisation 
of its financial and capital markets will reinforce such a trend. 
A continuation of Japanese trade surpluses and an outflow of 
foreign direct and portfolio investment from Japan will 
strengthen and internationalise the Yen, as will a larger share 
for Yen-denominated bonds in the Eurobond market. 
Japan's capacity to function as the key currency power is 
augmented by its vast store of personal savings, large trade 
surpluses and low interest rates, which facilitate its current 
role of world creditor, although access to these funds has been 
inhibited by the slow internationalisation of the yen. Since 
most countries have a trade deficit with Japan, international 
access to yen has only been possible through investment or 
borrowing on the Euroyen or Eurobond markets and these markets 
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were heavily regulated until the early 1980s. More recently yen 
borrowing has become easier for non-residents in the Samurai, 
Shogun and Euroyen markets due to the official relaxation of 
controls in these areas. However there is still limited access 
to the Tokyo public bond market which could provide a secure 
source of short-term government securities for international 
investors. 
Japan has accumulated a large portfolio of external assets 
in the 1980s, partly because its huge bilateral surplus with the 
US has failed to respond to the appreciation of the yen after 
1985 and the associated depreciation of the dollar. This stock 
of mostly portfolio investment will provide a continuing stream 
of foreign exchange earnings in future years which will ensure a 
Japanese surplus on current account, even if the trade surplus 
falls, thus qualifying Japan as a immature creditor country 
(Yoshitomi, 1987). 
The rlse of Japan to this status has been extraordinarily 
rapid, compared to the experiences of Britain in the nineteenth 
century and the US in the twentieth century. Japan proceeded 
from being an immature debtor country in 1945 to generating 
current account surpluses in 1965 and became an immature creditor 
country in 1972, with current account surpluses and net receipts 
of investment income. In Yoshitomi's view (Yoshitomi, 1987 p10), 
it will be a long time before Japan becomes a mature creditor 
country, as did Britain in late nineteenth century, with trade 
deficits being more than offset by net receipts of investment 
income (see table 13). 
Over the period 1973-82 Japan's cumulative current account 
surplus was only 0.3 per cent of its accumulative GNP and its 
terms of trade have fluctuated wildly since 1971, initially 
causing deficits in the 1970s and then continual surpluses in the 
1980s. Between 1972 and 1982, for example, Japan's terms of 
trade worsened by 43 per cent, causlng a GNP loss of about 10 per 
cent in this period. Conversely Japan gained markedly from a 
stronger yen in the 1980s, Slnce most of the imports of raw 
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TABLE 13: STAGES OF KEY CURRENCY COUNTRIES AS CREDITORS AND DEBTORS 
Stage I 
Immature Debtor Country 
Stage II 
Mature Debtor Country 
with CUrrent Account 
surpluses, but net 
payments of investment 
. 
mcorne 
Stage III 
Dmmature Creditor 
Country ith Current 
account Surpluses plus 
net receipts of 
investment income 
Stage IV 
Mature Creditor Country 
with trade deficits 
more than offset by net 
receipts of investment 
lncorne 
BRITAIN 
-1800(a) 
1801-1870 
1870-1945 
UNITED 
STATES 
1982-1989 
-1917 
1918-1970 
1971-1981 
JAPAN 
(potential) 
1945-64 
1965-71 
1972-
Source: Based on Yoshitomi (1987) who estimated Japan's stages of 
developnent 
(a) Estimate by Edelstein (1982) 
44a 
materials and energy were denominated in dollars, contributing to 
a 10 per cent gain in GNP. (EPA, 1987-88 Economic Outlook) 
These fluctuations would not be so evident if the yen was 
accepted as the key currency Slnce, most of Japan's trade would 
then be denominated in its domestic currency, thereby providing a 
cushion for trade adjustment problems and an automatic hedging 
process for Japanese trade and finance. Notably the risk in 
trade and investment in other countries would also be reduced, 
although the American market would still operate in dollars. 
Part of Japan's insecurity in relation to its foreign trade 
has been its vulnerability to fluctuations in oil prices, 
expecially in the 1970s. The oil crises of 1973-74 and 1979-80 
caused large deficits in Japan's current account and another 
Middle East crisis could again destabilise its current account 
position, although Japan's increased use of coal and nuclear 
energy has markedly reduced its vulnerability. Nevertheless if 
OPEC decided to denominate its oil exports in yen, this would 
provide oil producers with a more stable source of income, given 
the considerable fluctuations in the dollar's value since 1971 
and would virtually eliminate Japan's exposure to an oil shock. 
Japan as the World Banker 
While Japan has emerged with the world's largest creditor 
economy in the 1980s it will not formally become the world's 
banker until the yen becomes a key currency. The traditional 
role of world banker would then involve providing international 
liquidity and a flow of investment capital to the rest of the 
world and acting as a stabilizer of world finance in offering 
'lender of last resort' facilities to international institutions 
and sovereign borrowers. 
Almost all of Japan's capital outflow up to the late 1980s 
has been into portfolio investment and real estate in the US, but 
a small part has been siphoned to the developing countries of the 
Third World and the fast growlng economies of Japan's immediate 
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region, such as China and ASEAN. The greater international-
isation of the yen will facilitate such investment and a key role 
for the yen would probably accelerate capital outflows of 
portfolio investment outside the US, particularly foreign aid and 
direct investment in other countries in Japan's region. 
If Japan becomes a key currency country it will operate in a 
similar way to a nationally based bank in 'borrowing short and 
lending long' by absorbing non-resident investment in 
yen-denominated financial instruments such as Treasury Bonds or 
short term government securities and 'lend long' through longer 
term capital investments, in a similar way to Britain and the US 
in the first stage of their key currency regimes. Such lending 
would probably be domestically funded initially, from Japan's 
large structural savings and trade surplus. 
The rise of Japan to the status of world banker would be a 
natural result of the failure of the US in the 1970s and 1980s to 
carry out all the functions normally expected of the issuer of 
the key currency. The US seems to be now using its role as 
world banker to finance its own expanding deficits instead of 
redirecting capital to the rest of the world, which is generally 
poorer and less capital rich than the US itself (Triffin, 1987 
p241).It has also been responsible for a vast increase in 
international liquidity, through a growth in money produced by 
government fiat, rather than from surpluses of savings or 
international trade. This trend has been justified in the past 
by the reluctance of surplus countries to internationalise their 
currencies, which effectively constrains international 
liquidity. As Rapp notes: 
"While Japan has been supplying capital to the world 
the world in the form of finance to buy exports, it is 
the US that has been supplying liquidity to fuel 
growth" (Rapp 1987 p16) 
Is the internationalisation of the yen and its possible 
emergence as a key currency likely to be beneficial for Japan and 
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the world economy? Such a transition would have effects on both 
the functioning of the international monetary system and the 
relationship between the US and Japan. Fujii considers that a 
single 'hegemonic' key currency system is unlikely to replace the 
dollar standard since the world is now a multipolar in both 
economic and political terms (Fujii, 1987). 
A Co-Key Currency System? 
The large share of the US in world trade and investment has 
given the dollar a significant advantage as an international 
currency compared to the Mark or the Yen but the rising economic 
importance of Japan in world markets and the importance of the 
Mark in the European Community, suggests that alternative key 
currencies are possible. It is also possible that a co-key 
currency system could emerge as the dollar's role becomes less 
dominant and one or more other major currencies become more 
frequently used. 
Is a co-key currency monetary order likely for the dollar 
and the Yen? Amaya has argued that freer trade and co-ordination 
of monetary policy between the US and Japan could lead to a Pax 
Amerinipponica and use of both the yen and the dollar as key 
currencies (Amaya, 1988). On the other hand it may be that 
economic realities will prevent any form of monetary dualism and 
•••• 
" ... a plan for Joint Japan-US leadership, while 
extremely desirable in terms of a Japan-US alliance on 
the political front, nevertheless holds the potential 
for fundamental instability on the economic front" 
(Yoshitomi 1989) 
It is also possible, as Epstein argues, that a multiple key 
currency scheme, as occurred in the 1920s and 1930s, would be 
inherently unstable since: 
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that, 
"By their nature exchange markets are highly 
speculative. Without a centre of gravity (ie. a 
single key currency) they tend to exace rbate 
instability, not reduce it." (Epstein, p639) 
Nevertheless the breakdown of US monetary hegemony suggests 
"A realistic international currency system will be a 
system of multiple key currencies in which the dollar, 
Yen and ECU co-exist" (Suzuki, 1987) 
Prospects for the Yen and the Dollar 
Since the US has de facto responsibility for the stability 
of the international monetary system, a greater role for the Yen, 
and closer co-ordination between US and Japanese monetary 
policies, would share the 'burden' of managing the system. In 
fact Japan has already shared part of this burden through its 
support for the current key currency and it is arguable that the 
US has mismanaged the system (Strange 1987) and indulged in 
'malign neglect' of the dollar (Calleo 1988) and the multipolar 
nature of the world economy calls for a devolution of monetary 
hegemony. 
An increase in Yen denomination of world trade and fi nance 
will diversify the number of currencies used in international 
transactions and hence spread the exchange risk away from 
dependence on one currency. This risk has been particularly 
marked over the last decade for commodity exporters and holders 
of dollar-denominated financial securities. 
For Japan a more international Yen would reduce the e xc hang e 
risk for Japanese enterprises, but would accelerate the growth of 
Yen assets outside the control of domestic authorities a n d 
destabilise domestic monetary policy. However the experience of 
Britain and the US suggests that a capital exporter and world 
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creditor is unlikely to be troubled by this factor, particularly 
in the first stage of a key currency regime when confidence in 
the international currency is strong. Confidence in the sterling 
and the dollar was a fundamental element supporting their 
acceptance as the key currency, as was the soundness of the 
economies of Britain and the US respectively and the op leness of 
their trade and financial markets. Both economies had few 
foreign exchange restrictions and developed a global banking 
network which was able to support the use of the international 
currency. 
The rapid increase in Euroyen loans by Japanese banks in the 
1980s and the removal of restrictions on the issue of yen 
denominated bonds in the Euromarket are part of a definite trend 
to a more international Yen and its possible emergence as a key 
currency. This trend has been reinforced by the sudden rise to 
global dominance of Japanese banks which could easily augment a 
key role for the yen since, in terms of assets, the top ten 
commercial banks in the world are all Japanese. As Krause notes: 
"If the world economy was to shift to a yen standard, 
there would be no shortage of Japanese financial 
institutions to service foreign customers" (Krause 
1988 p10) 
In 1988 Tokyo's share of world banking business outstripped 
that of London for the first time, (BIS, 1989) and this change 
occurred relatively rapidly since 1986 when London's share was 
about 24 per cent, that of Tokyo only 15 per cent, while New York 
has handled about 10 per cent of international banking volume in 
recent years (see table 13a and Chart 1). This trend is likely 
to continue because of the more restrained liquidity base of 
Western banks due to current deficits and lower savings in the US 
and Western Europe, while the Japanese share of new international 
bank lending rose to 40 per cent in 1988. 
The Japanese role in world finance is likely to expand 
further as its do estic market becomes increasingly deregulated 
49 
r 
13 A Foreign Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks - an International Comparison 
1980 '8S '86 
Total assets (a) 257,079 "00,254 "45 ,359 
Ratio of (a) over GNP (107.1) (126.1) (134 .4) 
lapan .Foreign assets (b) 10,928 25,329 36,022 
(Yl billion, %) Weight of (b) over (a), (bla) (4 .3) (6.3) (8 .1) 
Foreign liabDities (c) 18,870 40,890 59,600 
Weight of (c) over (a), (cIa) (1.3) (10.'2) (13.4) 
Total assets (a) 14,502 22,059 24,524 
Ratio of (a) over GNP, % (53.1) (56 .1) (51.9) 
U.S.A. Foreign assets (b) 1,918 J ,1376 1,986 
($1 00 million, %) Weight of (b) over (a), (b/a) (13.2) (8.5) (8 .1 ) 
Foreign liabilities (c) 1,451 1,795 2,081 
. Weight of (c) over (a), (cIa) (10.0) (8.1) (8 .5) 
Total assets (a) 2,330 6,026 5,880 
Ratio of (a) over GNP, % (101.0) (170.4) (155.9) 
Britain Foreign assets (b) 1,509 4,352 4,051 
(Ll 00 million, %) . Weight of (b) over (a), (bla) (64 .8) (72.2) (68.9) 
Foreign liabilities (c) 1,572 4 ,536 4,160 
Weight of (c) over (a), (~/a) (67.5) (75.3) (70.7) 
Notes: 1. Source: lMF "International Financial Statistics." 
2. Figures for U.S.A. and Britain are the sum of figures of their commercial banks; figures for 
lapan are the .um of figure. of its commercial banks (excepting trust funds), mutual 
banks, credit unJona, Norinchukin and Shokochukin. 
(%) 
100 
80 
60 
40 
- 20 
o 
Chart I ' Share of Japanese Banks in Euro Deposits 
/ 
U.S . bank. 
'75 '76 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '82' '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 (End of year) 
SOURCE: 
Notes : 1. Sdurce: Bank of England "Quarterly Bulletin." 
2. Share of foreign deposits in Britain. 
EPA, ECONOMIC SURVEY OF JAPAN, 1987-88 
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'87 
500,867 
(145 .2) 
--- -
48,3 16 
(9 7) 
-
80,041 
(16 .0) 
--
26,028 
(58 .0) 
--
2,353 
-(90) 
.-
2,615 
(10.2) 
1,P28 
(17:2.. 0) 
-
4 ,816 
. (685) 
-
4,93 t 
(70 7) 
--
and diversified (see table 13b). These changes will make Tokyo 
the leading financial market, if current trends continue (see 
table 14) and its role will become more similar to that performed 
in the past key currency regimes by London and New York. A more 
sophisticated market in Tokyo will provide an alternative avenue 
for the vast capital outflows from Japan to the US, predominantly 
to the US Treasury Bond market, as direct and portfolio 
investment to other countries gradually increases. 
The US now satisfies only two of Kindleberger's requirements 
for an economlC hegemon (see Kindleberger, 1973). It is a market 
for surplus production and the source of credit creation but the 
role of world lender has now passed to Japan, creating a shared 
form of hegemony and an increased level of US interdependence 
with other countries. In fact Japan has acted as a stabilizer of 
the international monetary system and a lender of last resort to 
the US in recent years. 
A natural extension of this role would be for Japan to help 
solve the Third World debt crisis and the 1988 Miyazawa Plan had 
this intention, but failed to recelve US approval. It is 
arguable that the US rejected the Miyazawa Plan because it took 
the initiative away from the traditional political and economic 
leader, which had been the main source of international capital 
until the 1980s (Fukikawa, 1988). The 1989 Baker Plan for the 
Third World is similar to that of Miyazawa and will probably be 
mostly financed by Japanese banks, but is a US initiative, 
although there is a paradox in the US seeking to manage this 
.. . 
criSiS since: 
"The international debt crisis required rapid US 
economic growth and low interest rates. Yet to 
maintain the dollar's international role the United 
States must maintain high interest rates and slow 
growth." (Epstein, 1986 p636) 
The Third World debt crisis has created a major schism ln 
the world economy and affected the structure of world order since 
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Table 13 B International Comparison of the Tax System related to Financial Transactions 
I J ;:nar. I U.S.A Britian W Germany \ Fr:mcc: 
Securities Government bonds, None 0.5% is levied As an exchange As .1.n excnange 
transaction etc.: 0.01%, 0.3% on atocks, do- transaction tax, transaction tax, 
tax . Convertible bonda: benture, etc. 0.1 % is levied on 0.3-0.6% is levied 
0.09,0.26% &3 a trans! er tax. public bonds and on stocks and con-
Stocb: 0.18%, 0.55% Government 0.25% on business vertible bonds (on 
(uJ't : the rates for bondi, however. bonds and Itocb.. both sellers and 
transactions with a BIe not taxable. However, transac- buyers). while 
security company aJ tions among deal- government bonds 
the assignor. ers themselves are and corporate bonds 
Right: all other cases.) not taxed. are not taxable. 
Sump tax Prom.iuory notes, None Same as above T£x on drafts Stamp tax on 
drafts (From morc (abolished in (15 pennin,g for commercial drafts 
than ¥lOO,OOO 1968) DMIOO) (3 to 10 francs), 
(¥200) to over ¥1 tax on bank checks 
billion (¥200,000), ~ (5 francs). etc. 
it is divided into dil-
" 
ferent levels. and a 
fixed amount is levied 
. on each level 
Taxation on Tax collected at the Non-taxable Designated Non-taxable Non-taxable 
bond interest 10ur"~ (20%) (abolishrd in public bonds (abolished in 
viH-vis non- 1984) BIe not taxed. 1978) 
re&ident while all others 
BIe taxed on a 
consolidated 
basis. 
Tax col- None None None - -
..-
~ 
lected at 
.)I. theaource g 
~ Corporate Corporate tax and Highest federal National tax: - -... 
0 local tax com bipod: tax rate of 34% Ordinary tax I .c tax '!' New York State, rate of 35% .... 51.55% 0 New York City I 
I 
both tax- I 
exempt. 
Note: Wlth regard to the offshore market, only Japan, U.S.A. and Britain alone are compared. 
S(ll~RC [:1'[.'" ~::-Cn'Kl!'lIC SURVEY OF .JhPI\~ , -:('[7 - 2[, 
TABLE 14: MARKET SIZE OF THE WORLD STOCK EXCHANGES 
1986 AND 1987 
INDICATOR 
'Ibtal Market 
value ($USB) 
Stocks 
Bonds 
Trading Value 
( $USB) 
Stocks 
Bonds 
Number of Stock 
Listed Companies 
Domestic 
Foreign 
Number of Listed 
Issues of Stocks 
Domestic 
Foreign 
Number of Listed 
Issues of Bonds 
Domestic 
Foreign 
TOKYO 
1986 1987 
1794 2726 
772 2052 
955 1758 
836 907 
1499 1532 
52 88 
1504 1533 
52 88 
742 994 
237 209 
SOURCE: Tokyo Stock Exchange 
NEW YORK 
1986 1987 
2129 2132 
1692 1621 
1374 1874 
10 10 
1516 1580 
59 67 
2194 2174 
63 70 
3384 3133 
222 213 
50b 
LONDON 
1986 1987 
473 685 
448 534 
133 317 
265 471 
2102 2061 
584 597 
1781 1911 
490 666 
2917 2878 
1556 1292 
a number of maJor debtors such as Brazil are significant states 
in the world economy and regional hegemons. A solution to the 
problem depends on policy co-ordination between the US and Japan 
and could weaken the dollar standard as the yen is used to 
denominate new capital flows to the region. Similarly the 
increased influence of Japan in the IMF, which will occur under 
refinancing as the organisation's capital base is enlarged, 
implies reduced US influence. 
Political tension between the US an Japan is also likely if 
OPEC decides to value its oil contracts in yen rather than 
dollars, since this would constitute a direct challenge to the US 
national interest. Denomination of world trade in oil, which 
accounts for between 10 and 20 per cent of total international 
trade, has buoyed up the dollar as a key currency, particularly 
in the 1970s when a dollar shortage developed after the large oil 
price increases. Paradoxically these crises were partly 
attributable to expansionary US monetary and fiscal policy during 
this decade, which lowered the real value of exports for OPEC 
(Cattley 1984 and Keohane 1980). 
Although both the dollar and the yen have fluctuated 
significantly since 1971 it seems that there is less downside 
risk to the yen, given the healthier state of the Japanese 
economy, so that yen could be a more stable vehicle currency for 
oil. However the US's security role in the Middle East might be 
undermined if this occurred and countries such as Saudi Arabia 
are likely to continue to support dollar denomination of oil 
unless a crisis occurs in its value. 
The continuation of US trade and budget deficits has created 
a pool of dollar liquidity and dollar securities which has been 
translated into direct foreign investment in the key currency 
country and a rising stock of portfolio investment, which imposes 
an additional negative drain on the US current account. These 
trends are causing political tension in the key currency country 
because of resentment over foreign investment and are 
contributing to a rising movement towards US protectionism ln 
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trade and finance. The imposition of restrictions by the US ln 
these areas will further erode the dollar standard since one of 
the requirements for an international currency is an absence of 
restrictions in the central economy. Japan's direct and 
portfolio investment in the US 'will yield a stream of interest, 
dividends, and rents to Japanese owner's and if Japanese 
investors should want to write contracts in yen, then it will be 
difficult for others to resist' (Krause 1988). The creation of 
yen denominated US Treasury Bonds would have a similar impact. 
Political tensions could arise if Japanese or other 
international investors refused to finance the US deficit unless 
Treasury Bonds were yen denominated, since this would reduce the 
US's flexibility in financing and repaying foreign debt in 
dollars. In 1986 Prime Minister Nakasone floated the idea of US 
government securities denominated in yen or 'Nakasone Bonds' but 
the Reagan Administration rejected this proposal. 
The direction of US monetary diplomacy under the Reagan 
Administration, which culminated in the Yen-Dollar Agreement of 
1984 and the 1985 Plaza Agreement, may have weakened the dollar 
regime and sowed the seeds for a future yen standard by forcing a 
dramatic revaluation of the yen. The revaluation was intended to 
reduce the US-Japan trade imbalance (see table 15) but only a 
marginal change has occurred in the bilateral trade surpluses of 
Japan, while the value of Japanese financial assets virtually 
doubled. These events eroded confidence in the dollar in the 
mid-80s and boosted the yen's share of the international bond 
market but it is possible that the dollar would have fallen to 
similar levels, albeit more slowly, if the Plaza Agreement had 
not occurred. 
These factors are all relevant in discussing the prospects 
of the yen and the dollar but the essential question is whether 
the yen can become a new key currency as defined in this paper. 
For this to happen the other major economies, excluding the 
United States, would need to support the new standard and third 
party countries trading or financing between themselves would 
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TABLE 15: INTERNATIONAL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN ($USM) 
JAPAN 
Trade Current 
1980 2125 -10746 
1981 19967 4770 
1982 18079 6850 
1983 31454 20799 
1984 44257 35003 
1985 55986 49169 
1986 92827 85845 
1987 96386 87015 
1988 (a) 43492 (b) 75508 
SOURCE: Bank of Japan, Balance of Payments, 
Monthly and Economic Report of the President 1989. 
(a) First two quarters annualised 
(b) First three quarters annualised 
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US 
Trade 
-25480 
-27978 
-36444 
-67080 
-112522 
-122148 
-144547 
-160280 
-93868 
Current 
1873 
6884 
-8679 
-46246 
-107077 
-115103 
-138828 
-153964 
-135428 
have to reject the dollar as a vehicle currency if it becomes 
increasingly unstable. The continuation of tight monetary policy 
in the US, however, may make this unlikely in the short term. 
Nevertheless a lack of improvement in either the US trade or 
budget deficit will further erode confidence in the dollar and 
increase the exchange rate risk of holding it as a financial 
asset. 
If this occurred the yen would become much more attractive 
as a vehicle and reserve currency and a store of financial value, 
but the emergence of a key currency regime based on the yen 1S 
not a choice for Japan only, but also an option for other 
countries. Moreover Japan seems unlikely to accept such a role 
for the yen in the short term because of its high level of 
interdependence with the US. It therefore seems that the 
emergence of such a regime will only be gradual, unless there is 
a collapse in international confidence in the dollar standard. 
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5 COSTS AND BENEFITS OF KEY CURRENCIES 
A sound key currency reg1me brings benefits to all 
participants in international trade and finance but the key 
currency state benefits in particular from its central economic 
position and monetary hegemony in the form of political 
leadership, economic influence, seigniorage and reduced exposure 
to the adjustment pressures affecting other states in the 
international economy. As the state responsible for issuing 
international money both Britain and the United States, during 
certain periods, were able to influence the global money supply, 
world interest rates and the conduct of policy in other, 
nominally sovereign states. 
To the other states 1n the world economy, particularly other 
major powers, acceptance of the key currency clearly involves a 
cost through their surrender of influence over the management of 
the world monetary system. Since the 1950s both Japan and West 
Germany have been reluctant to directly challenge the dollar's 
key role or internationalise their currencies, even though their 
relative economic size vis-a-vis the US has changed markedly. 
Since the second and third largest market economies have sought 
to avoid exposure to monetary instability and uncertainty, the 
dollar has been the de facto central currency, despite a surge 1n 
dollar based international liquidity over the last two decades 
and inappropriate policies in the US. Policy devolution by 
Japan and West Germany has occurred partly because of the 
dependence of both states on the still larger US economy and the 
political alliance which binds all three states. 
Nevertheless the increased economic imoortance of the 
~ 
creditor economies of Japan and West Germany 1n the 1970s and 
1980s (see table 16) and the continuation of US deficits at 
higher levels weakened the strength of the political-strategic 
rationale of defending the dollar, since the monetary order: 
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YEAR 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1985 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
TABLE 16: CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES AND IMBALANCES 
1968-1987 (US BILLION) 
UNITED 
STATES 
1 
2 
-1 
-6 
7 
2 
18 
4 
-15 
-15 
-1 
2 
7 
-9 
-46 
-107 
-116 
-141 
-161 
JAPAN F.R. 
GERMANY 
1 
2 
2 
6 1 
7 1 
5 
-5 10 
-1 4 
4 4 
1 1 4 
16 9 
-9 06 
-11 -16 
5 -5 
7 4 
21 4 
35 8 
49 15 
86 35 
87 45 
SOURCE: IMF, International Financial Statistics 
54a 
OPEC 
-2 
-2 
-1 
1 
3 
6 
67 
32 
36 
25 
-1 
57 
104 
50 
-10 
-22 
-7 
4 
-32 
na 
" •.. depended for its proper functioning on a political 
relationship between the US and the other major 
industrial countries •.. It was acceptable as long as 
Europe and Japan felt dependent, politically and 
strategically, on the goodwill of the US ••• economic 
and political changes made the hegemony of the dollar 
an anachronism" (Calleo, 1987) 
This continued willingness of the other states to allow 
monetary hegemony highlights the cost or burden of the key 
currency state which must keep its trade and financial markets 
open and sacrifice some domestic policy goals to maintain the 
value of the international currency. The size of this burden 
seems to vary with the size of the central economy and 
the convertibility of its currency. For Britain, with a large 
but not predominant economy in the nineteenth century, the cost 
of monetary hegemony was often monetary contraction to maintain 
sterling's value against gold. For the united States, with a 
much larger share of the world economy, national policies were 
less constrained by the value of the dollar, particularly after 
the gold window was effectively closed in 1968. Indeed Strange 
considers that US administrations have been: 
" ••. far more swayed by short term domestic 
considerations that by any awareness of the long term 
national interest in building a healthy, well ordered 
and stable financial system" (Strange, 1986 p23) 
Competitiveness 
The openness of the central economy exposes its industries 
to intense competition from the rest of the world, which needs to 
earn the key currency by exporting to this market. Over time 
this exposure affects the international competitiveness of 
the key currency state, which adjusts more slowly to this trend 
because of its lack of sensitivity to balance of payments 
deficits. The fixed value of sterling in the gold standard 
system and the dollar under Bretton Woods also disadvantaged 
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non-financial industries as thel: currencies became overvalued 
because of declining competitiveness, while an exchange rate 
adjustment was not possible. Even in the floating dollar regime 
after 1971 the strength of the key currency continued to 
contribute to the worsening US trade performance. 
Whether this loss of competitiveness is part of the burden 
of the economic hegemon (Keohane 1980, Giplin 1987) or part of a 
failure of macroeconom1C or industry policy in the central 
economy 1S questionable. Part of the problem comes from the dual 
function of the key currency in trade and finance and the 
trade-off within the central economy between these sectors. 
Hence the fixed value of sterling (against gold) made 
devaluation difficult and worsened the competitiveness of 
traditional British industry, which was also caught in a monetary 
squeeze whenever a gold outflow had to be averted. However the 
strength of sterling gave the British financial sector a distinct 
advantage and : 
"With the pound as good as gold, British banking 
houses could insure the value of all money left in 
their vaults, a major advantage in attracting the 
world's deposits. These deposits could then be lent 
out long term at higher interest rates" (Edelstein, 
1982, 653) 
The advantage of the banking system in the key currency 
country lies in its direct access to that country's deposit base, 
which represents a store of international purchasing power to be 
lent out to foreigners. However a slowing of the current account 
surpluses of a key currency country and a low savings rate is 
likely to erode this advantage. By the time the US had emerged 
as the world's major creditor London's role as the key currency 
centre was being overshadowed by that of New York and US banks 
were becoming increasingly dominant. 
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When the dollar became the de jure key currency in the 
-
postwar period, American banks expanded their global position and 
by 1970 held 43 per cent of the world's banking assets. However 
the worsening US savings performance adversely affected the US 
financial sector, particularly as creditor states such as Japan 
and West Germany did not follow the OPEC precedent of investing 
through American banks. Indeed the declining financial 
competitiveness of this sector led the US to pursue the 1984 
Yen-Dollar Agreement, to give US banks access to the Japanese 
deposit base. 
The deregulation of the Japanese financial market and 
revaluation of the yen were both objectives pursued by the US 
but the 1985 revaluation of the Yen against the dollar virtually 
doubled the deposit base of Japanese banks in terms of dollars so 
that by 1987 Japanese banks accounted for all of the top ten 
positions in the international banking system. The prominence of 
Japanese banks in the US Treasury bond market and their 
management of the rising outflows of Japanese capital in the 
1980s provides a distinct competitive advantage in the world 
financial market, since a comparative advantage in financial 
intermediation normally develops where there is an abundance of 
capital, a large domestic market for financial services and a 
sophisticated financial sector, as occurs in Japan (Arndt, 1988). 
Overall, it seems that the need to maintain open markets for 
trade and finance eventually constrains the competitiveness of 
industry in the key country, especially when monetary contraction 
is used to prop up the key currency. This process also creates 
other distortions to competitiveness and the interest-led rise in 
Third World debt, followed by a commodity glut to finance it , is 
one example. The large US trade deficit has also caused a 
disproportionate flow of imports to that market which thereby 
distorts normal trade flows. It IS questionable how the market 
mechanism can rationally allocate resources, given the extreme 
oscillation in the values of the dollar (Calleo, 1988) which 
provides confusing signals about international competitiveness 
and comparative advantage. 
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Monetary Stability 
The stability of the international monetary system depends 
on the soundness of the international currency and responsible 
policies in the central economy. It is unclear whether a 
multiple currency system is inherently unstable but historical 
experience seems to suggest a single key currency reduces 
uncertainty if the underlying economy of the issuing economy is 
sound. During the 1920s and 1930s competition between the 
dollar, franc and sterling blocs was destabilizing and foreign 
markets may need a 'centre of gravity' or numeraire for stability 
(Epstein, 1985). Similarly Yeager observes that: 
"If more key currencies than one served as 
international liquidity ••• the possibility would remain 
of flights (of capital) from a relatively distrusted 
to relatively trusted key currency. The system works 
best when there is only one key currency" (Yeager, 
1966 p487) 
Regime stability is also influenced by the formal structure 
of the exchange rate system. In a fixed rate system, where a few 
large economies are influential, stability may be greater than in 
a flexible regime in which rates fluctuate significantly and 
uncertainty increases. Since the demise of Bretton Woods in 1971 
the rapid expansion of the international capital markets, wide 
divergence of interest rates and fluctuations in exchange rates 
all support the contention that a fixed rate system provides more 
stability. Indeed the original forecast of economists that 
flexible exchange rates and capital flows would allow stabilizing 
speculation seems to have been mistaken (Friedman, 1953). 
Seemingly the stability of the floating dollar standard has 
been compromised because there is no external constraint on the 
US acting responsibly 1n following stable fiscal and monetary 
policies . and since 
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" ... a 'pure' key currency system 1S not well designed 
to deal with instability in the key currency country 
itself, although it can handle considerable upheaval 
elsewhere" (McKinnon, 1974) 
The need for policy co-ordination to achieve monetary 
stability is particularly apparent in a floating system Slnce 
exchange markets are highly speculative and, 'Without a centre of 
gravity they tend to exacerbate instability, not reduce it" 
(Epstein, 1985 p639) but it is arguable that the key currency 
state's influence over interest rates and money supply has been 
increasingly shared since 1971 with the international capital 
markets. 
Some degree of interest rate policy co-ordination appears to 
have occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, with US rates staying above 
those in other economies to attract a deficit financing, capital 
inflow. The interest rate differential between New York and 
Tokyo has been relatively constant and Japan's official discount 
rate appears to have been set at a low level to stimulate capital 
outflow to the US and increase domestic demand for imports. On 
this point the Economist has commented that: 
Liquidity 
"Japanese authorities seem committed to maintaining 
low interest rates and an easy monetary policy as part 
of a self-imposed task of ensuring a soft landing for 
the American economy" (Economist, 9 January 1989) 
The stability of the monetary system is also affected by the 
creation of both credit and liquidity by the key currency state. 
In the sterling standard liquidity was primarily determined by 
the rate of gold discovery, not domestic monetary expansion and 
was relatively moderate (Triffin, 1978). 
While the gold-sterling standard was reliant on gold 
production to augment international liquidity, the gold-dollar 
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standard of Bretton Woods relied on continual US balance of 
payments deficits for this purpose, particularly up until 1958 
when the Western European economies re-established currency 
convertibility. Up until the late 1950s an outflow of dollars In 
loans, aid and investment was perceived as necessary to create 
international liquidity for European and Japanese recovery and 
concern was expressed over the 'dollar gap'. However during the 
1960s continual US deficits created a 'dollar overhang' as the 
volume of overseas dollars began to exceed the US's gold 
reserves, thereby undermining the basis of the gold-exchange 
standard. There appears to be an inherent paradox in the 
dollar's function of providing both stability and liquidity 
since: 
" •.• additions to international liquidity made possible 
by the system are entirely dependent upon the 
willingness of the key currency countries to allow 
their own net reserve position to deteriorate, by 
letting their short term liabilities to foreigners 
grow persistently and indefinitely at a faster pace 
then their own gold assets ••• " (Triffin, 1961) 
In the floating dollar regime the creation of liquidity has 
not been even nominally constrained by convertibility and a 
continuous expansion has occurred in dollar outflows into the 
international monetary system, thereby placing pressure o n the 
key currency and destabilizing the value of dollar denominated 
trade and financial flows and stocks. The emergence of Japan as 
the world's largest creditor in the 1980s, providing 
international liquidity through savings and capital outflows can 
be contrasted with the United States position of creating 
international liquidity through large trade and budget deficits 
instead of capital exports to the rest of the world. A 
continuation of these trends will be destabilizing and likely to 
cost the key currency state its monetary hegemony and lead to a 
more multipolar monetary system. This would seem to suggest that 
the trade-off between national and international costs and 
60 
benefits is less of an issue if the key currency is stable than 
when confidence in its role begins to falter. 
Overview 
In the early phase of a key currency regime the domestic and 
foreign policy aims of the central state seem to be augmented by 
the currency's international role, although other states also 
benefit from a stable key currency through lower transaction 
costs and exchange risk. However, as Aliber observes, the 
benefit may be greater for the issuer of the key currency: 
" ••. the larger the area in which the dollar is 
acceptable, the easier it is for US businessmen andUS 
investors and tourists to conduct their own 
international transactions, for they do so ln their 
own currency ••• the willingness of foreign official 
institutions to acquire assets denominated in dollars 
as part of their international reserves has helped the 
US finance its payments deficit and eased the conflict 
among objectives resulting from the payments 
constraint" (Aliber, 1966 p9) 
The size of these benefits to the US are not easy to judge 
but may become apparent in the future if the dollar is no longer 
a key currency and Burstein warns that: 
"When the world goes off the dollar standard, we will 
be shocked by the increased costs of doing business 
abroad, higher fees for issuing debt, and the 
volatility of oil prices and other international 
commodities that are now conveniently quoted in our 
own currency" (Burstein, 1989 p52) 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The historical experience of the sterling and dollar key 
currency regimes suggests that the relative decline of the 
central economy leads to a more multipolar monetary system and a 
fragmentation of the world economy into more autonomous economic 
reg10ns. This occurred in the interwar period in the 1920s and 
1930s and seems to be occurring in the 1980s as Western Europe 
and Japan both develop regional 'spheres of influence'. In this 
context the region in which one currency dominates can be 
conceived of a sphere of influence since other states in this 
region become vulnerable to fluctuations of policies in the 
central economy_ Hence as monetary integration occur s in the 
European Community the ECU may become the dominant currency 1n 
both Western and Eastern Europe. 
In the Western Pacific a yen based currency bloc or sphere 
would by supported by the strength of the Japanese economy and 
its close ties with the nearby economies of South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, Thailand and China. Such a sphere would require a 
strong degree of political consensus for the yen to be accepted 
as the dominant currency used in regional trade and finance. It 
1S arguable that such a consensus does not yet exist because of 
regional fears of political as well as economic domination by 
Japan. The difficulty of achieving monetary integration in 
Europe after a decade of preparation illustrates this problem. 
The prospect of the yen becoming a global key currency 
therefore appears not to be promising in the short term. The 
United States economy is still the world's largest and 
appropriate US policies may facilitate its restructuring and 
recovery 1n com1ng decades. It is also possible that Japan's 
external surpluses will be eroded by greater imports, econom1C 
restructuring and offshore production or an oil price rise, while 
its savings surpluses may be directed more towards domestic 
targets such as housing and social security. 
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Moreover the current key currency power 1S likely to resist 
a loss of monetary hegemony through its remaining considerable 
political influence and although Western Europe and Japan are 
also major economic powers: 
"The united States, however, continues to be the 
leader in the sense that changes in the rules cannot 
occur without its co-operation (Hamada and Patrick, 
1988). 
Nevertheless a continuation of recent econom1C trends could 
lead to a collapse of confidence 1n the dollar as the key 
currency and the US could 'find the cost of the existing managed 
float will exceed the benefit of monetary dominion' (Gilpin, 
1987). It 1S also pertinent to ask whether 'the world's largest 
debtor nation (can) remain the world's leading power' (Bergsten, 
1987), especially since its policies have worsened the world 
debt crisis. 
A more multipolar currency system will require increased 
policy co-ordination to avoid undue monetary instability and the 
emergenc of insular regionalism. In this case there will be a 
need for the US 'to yield monetary dominion and seigniorage' and 
a need for Japan and West Germany to share monetary hegemony 
(Fujii, 1987). Since the US, Japan and West Germany together 
account for about two thirds of global industrial output and 
trade, co-ordination of monetary policy between them should 
enhance monetary stability (McKinnon 1984, 1988). However it 
seems equally likely that a dollar based international monetary 
system will endure if both Japan and West Germany find the 
political and economic benefits of the current regime outweigh 
the costs of changing to a new regime and therefore continue 
their support for the dollar. 
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